Re: Sentience Terminology

On Wed, 22 Mar 2006 18:43:28 +0200, Anssi Hyytiainen
<anssih@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:
On Mon, 20 Mar 2006 22:37:04 +0200, Anssi Hyytiainen
<anssih@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Differences, differences between differences, and that principle
compounded in terms of itself technically represent the only category.
The categories outlined above are just philosophical prejudices and
assumptions.

Ok, well here's one thing that confuses me. It kind of sounds like this
"differences" stuff is encompassing absolutely everything, even
philosophy, and is therefore "the truth" like nothing else can be.


Exactly right. The way I say it is that the idea of differences, not,
or contradiction is universally true because alternatives are self
contradictory.

Can you still give me an example of what is an "alternative" to
differences and how does it self contradict (unless the contradiction is
self-evident)

Anything "different from differences" is an alternative to
"differences". The presence of self contradiction is more evident if
we use "contradiction" instead of "differences" in which case
alternatives to "contradiction" become the "contradiction of
contradiction". Or if we use "not" instead of differences in which
case tautological alternatives to "not" become "not not". I use all
three variations to illustrate different mechanical implications of a
common theme.

I am vaguely picking up that you may mean the fact, that without
differences, everything is the same, and in effect, there is nothing.
Can we use this directly to analyze something like an atom, for example?

In which case, what is the difference between, say, an electron and
"no-electron", and whether with "no-electron" we should mean "space" or
an anti-electron (positron)?

The way I look at it, Anssi, is to approach the idea of differences in
space first from which we get geometric axioms and geometry. From
there we let ordinary math take over. Beyond that it's hard to say if
there is more to contribute. Then we look at compounded differences
between differences and examine ontological mechanisms and their
properties.

It is also slightly difficult to suppose computable numbers cannot do
what the neurons do in some sense (for anyone not supposing fundamental
"mind" anyway).

So neurons are just computable numbers?

No, it just says that the external behaviour of the neurons can be
replicated with numbers (with arbitrary accuracy). Of course you need to
express your calculations through physical interface to the other
neurons still.

If we speculate that consciousness exists because of the "high-level"
interaction between neurons, rather than because of the lower level
interaction happening INSIDE a neuron, then this high level interaction
can be physically identical regardless of if we use organic or
artificial neurons. The system should be conscious in both cases.

If it turns out that the interaction inside the organic neurons is
essential for consciousness, even then we can use any arbitrary method
to replicate the external behaviour of the different *components* of a
neuron.

That doesn't say anything about whether the organic functions inside the
neuron are essential for consciousness or not, but it does say that if
consciousness is not a fundamental property of nature, then it can be
replicated with a wide range of methods.

And I personally don't find it very plausible at this time, that
consciousness would be a fundamental property of the universe, or that
consciousness would exist in the simple interaction between fundamental
particles (i.e. I don't think there is any amount of consciousness in rocks)

And since it doesn't seem likely that it would be fundamental, I opt to
look at how it could exist as the very highest-level of interaction in
our brain (in which case this very highest level can be rather
incomprehensible for us, since it is the very basis of our understanding
capability).

These higher levels I talk about are basically logical levels, kind of
like how computer programs can be seen as multiple logical levels even
though every level correlates to physical matter.

So I believe that it is the very high-level information manipulation
that can make the system conceive itself as one (effectively make it
conscious), and this level is not aware about whether there are organic
or artificial neurons producing this information manipulation
(semantical learning), or whether there even are any neurons there, or
just numbers.

Consciousness then, would be purely a side-product of such survival
tactic, that has learned to "simulate" the environment artificially "in
the head", and to do so it has to assume artificial models of things it
perceives, and pick out "sensible objects" and that sort (semantical
learning), and eventually also pick up a semantical model of "self",
which becomes the basis of subjective reality as far as this learning
system is concerned.

Hmmm, I don't think that was very clear description, but hopefully you
could follow the outlines little bit.

Clear enough. I just don't think you appreciate the significance of
computable numbers in connection with neuron models and subjective
mechanics. What you say could be true and computer emulations of
neurons could still be inadequate to emulate subjective properties.
The whole problem I see is that computable numbers are not subjective
mechanically simply because universal negation of something cannot be
objective. And without emulation through subjective mechanics we have
no way to emulate actual ontological consciousness due to particular
implications of negation.

Would you think this is possible in principle?

No. Not unless we account for subjective cerebral mechanics which
results in mental effects. And we can't do that with TvN mechanics
unless neurons are computable numbers.

Would you think it is enough to duplicate the behaviour of the different
components inside every neuron artificially?

I don't think we can emulate or duplicate subjective behavior of the
brain with TvN mechanics although we may well be able to model it.
Whether neurons exhibit subjective behavior I don't know. But I do
know subjective behavior is what makes cerebral mechanics what it is.
Otherwise we could replace the brain with a couple kilos of inert
matter.

Which level of abstraction do you think is important? If it was
physically possible to duplicate the behaviour of atoms artificially,
would that be ok, or is it the interaction between fundamental particles
(that form an atom) where consciousness "happens"?

I'm inclined to think consciousness is an architectural feature of
fourth order differences between differences. Conventional approaches
regress the search for consciousness to smaller and smaller features
of the brain.I'm inclined to look at the problem in differential terms
wherever we find the differences. So once we comprehend structural
requirements for consciousness it wouldn't really matter whether we
were looking at atoms, molecules, neurons, or anything else.

We might put it this way; "for a system to conceive itself as a whole,
does it need to be a physical object, or can a virtual object also
conceive itself as a whole?

Well here you're waltzing off into analogical fantasyland. We can say
lots of things about lots of things. Who cares? It's what we can say
exhaustively about anything that matters scientifically.

It's just philosophical discussion. We can talk about whether mankind
will terraform Mars into a habitable planet, even though we cannot say
anything conclusive about the subject until we have actually done it.

I don't consider science philosophical speculation. Science begins
with speculation but finishes with demonstrations of truth.

Well, no one has been able to demonstrate any truths yet, and in
principle, no one will. We have no proof about the theory of relativity,
for example. There are only indications, but I think we can still call
science "science".

I understand what you are saying but disagree. I think I have been
able to demonstrate certain universal truth through tautological
regression of "differences" "not" or "contradiction" to self
contradictory alternatives. Whether or not others agree is an open
question. However I consider science in that light and not simply
whatever empirics want to make of their various speculations.

~v~~

.

Relevant Pages

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