Re: The problem of intelligence.

On Mon, 09 Jan 2006 01:24:46 GMT, Risujin <risujin@xxxxxxxxxxx> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>Unfortunately, nature equipped us with neither source code nor debug
>>>hooks so we are working backwards from tangible effects to intangible
>>>(through introspection) recipe.
>>>
>>>By this line of reasoning, trying to answer the question "by what method
>>>do I do this?" with regard to mental effects by introspection alone will
>>>fail. However, this does not mean *all* efforts are doomed. What we may
>>>not observe we may still invent.
>>
>> Well the problem here with this observation is that it assumes there
>> is any other way to proceed. Are we interested in intelligent effects
>> or are we interested in intelligence? If the latter we really have no
>> alternative to the arm chair introspection method because we have
>> nothing to study except the process itself and that is only evident in
>> ourselves. If we proceed empirically by studying the process in others
>> we have to proceed via tangibles to study an intangible. So if we know
>> what we're interested in is intangible we have no choice but to study
>> the intangible process itself and not tangible effects. Our study may
>> not succeed but the success of studying tangible effects will not shed
>> light on the mechanics of an intangible process.
>
>Ultimately we are interested in intelligent effects. Not only this but
>we would be satisfied if we had enough for our machine to be useful for
>processing information. Im not referring to intelligent results however,
>I dont mean we should find an algorithm for every useful thing we could
>do (such as searching, pathfinding, sorting etc). I mean we should build
>a system capable of doing that for us. *Those* intelligent effects are
>what we need.

Well I can agree here. But without knowing what the base intelligence
amounts to we won't be able to find that.

>In the name of this pursuit, human intelligence, which you consider
>intangible, and its effects are merely guides. We don't *need* to
>discover their inner workings.

Technically I consider the transition intangible and not the results.
And I consider the intangible mechanics of transition between what's
"out there" and what's "in here" to be similar in all sentient forms
and not just peculiar to humans.

>>>Explaining the transition within the biological brain would require far
>>>more knowledge about its inner workings that we have today. This path is
>>>closed to us.
>>
>> Well the only reason it's closed to us is we don't recognize what it
>> is we're looking at or looking for. Neurology has dual implications,
>> one for impaired brain function in medical terms and one for ai in
>> mechanical terms. I agree that simply prospecting for intelligence
>> within the brain is hopeless without some mechanical recognition of
>> what it is we're looking for and I've argued against the neurological
>> approach in ai for many years for exactly this reason.
>
>If you know what, say, a watch is and you've used one all your life but
>never bothered to peek inside and find out how it works, then given
>adequate observing technology you can open it up and observe it in
>action and deduce how it works. This is possible. There is no reason why
>we cannot do the same to the brain in theory, only our MRI scans and
>hammers don't qualify for adequate technology.

Well this is the issue. We don't in fact know there is no mechanical
reason we cannot do this. That's speculation. What seems to be the
case is that we have this thing called a brain and neural system which
we suppose to behave like a watch and infer it's simply a matter of
refinement of technique to figure out how the "watch" works. What if
the brain works differently from the watch? If we think it works the
same and open it up we won't know what we're looking at and won't
understand how to refine any technique we use to try to figure it out.

>>>The "pull something our of thin air and run with it" approach is the
>>>robotics way. Its failure is what I was referring to.
>>
>> I understand. But then do you see the skill of skills tangible or not?
>> I see it as a measurable tangible which doesn't shed light on the
>> mechanics of intangibles.
>
>I would draw an analogy with physics. The formulas of physics happen to
>be a tangible concepts rooted in something "pulled out of thin air".
>They were derived as approximations to reality. We do not know if
>reality contains infinitesimal quantities (i.e. intangible) but using
>them in our calculus proved practically very useful.

The "pulled out thin air" qualification doesn't refer to the origin of
thoughts. Everything is originally pulled out of thin air in some way
to begin with. What I mean by "pulled out of thin air" are the reasons
for whatever we think just because we think it.

With respect to the analogy with physics concepts I agree they're
tangible but I don't agree the mechanics used in physics is what
happens in the brain. Cerebral mechanics is differential in nature.
The fact that both sets of mechanics operate within and among
physical entities has no bearing on this issue and I consider that
this is exactly what constitutes the mind-body dichotomy. However I
would prefer you review the appended material rather than trying to
thrash this out right here.

>Why couldn't we draw up similar concepts for the search for
>intelligence? (I wouldn't propose "skill of skills" as such but the
>attempt was in this vein of thinking.)

Well we could draw up analogous concepts if we knew for a fact that
physical mechanics is what we're looking at in the brain.I don't think
so but suggest you review the appended material to clarify the issue.

>>>Then the problem would be one of interpretation. If the brain's "inner
>>>code" is cracked, the so-called "intangibles" become tangible. For this
>>>reason we can't say they are truly intangible, although inaccessible to
>>>us now.
>>
>> Well you raise a fascinating issue here.It's true they're inaccessible
>> to us now and intangible in this respect. But the problem then becomes
>> whether even if interpreted correctly in mechanical terms the process
>> becomes tangible or remains intangible. I suspect most cognitive code
>> breakers tacitly assume the former. I think we may eventually get to
>> the point where we can decipher, say, a numeral "2" somewhere in the
>> brain. But making use of that information in specific neural terms
>> will certainly be difficult and may prove mechanically impossible.
>
>Difficult no doubt, but impossible? Why? I see no reason why it would
>not be possible in theory (as in the watch example above).

Ditto my suggestion above. If we're dealing with physical mechanics
there would be no reason we couldn't. If not it's another problem.

>> It's a problem in what I call subjective mechanics.Normally we're used
>> to considering mechanics in terms of objective tangibles. What happens
>> in the brain that produces the mind and mental effects and yields
>> objective tangibles however is subjective in mechanical terms and not
>> objective. So even if we manage to decipher some numeral "2" in the
>> brain it's not evident we can say exactly how or in what form a brain
>> will make use of the information. We know the brain will make some use
>> of the information in mechanical terms. But if the mechanics is really
>> subjective we may not be able to identify the process in the course of
>> events in any particular mind.
>
>I don't follow your argument. Either you need to better define the terms
>you're using or you have made some unwarranted assumptions. What exactly
>is "subjective mechanics"? How could mechanics depend on the observer?
>What we are talking about is strictly *objective*.

Ditto my suggestion above. What we are discussing is strictly
objective. But brain operations are subjective and recognizing what
this means in strictly mechanical terms makes the subject objective.

>In the watch example I could decipher the numeral "2" within the inner
>workings of my watch just as well. I see no reason why I couldn't also
>observe the system to see what it did to and with my numeral to decipher
>how it worked. How is the brain different?

Well there is no suggestion in analog watches that the numeral "2"
ever has an intangible transition between tangible forms. It exists as
paint or metal outside the watch and subsequently becomes a "2" inside
the watch. But can the same be said for a bit representation of the
numeral "2" in a digital watch? There I think you'd be stuck trying to
decipher the numeral "2" in binary digital mechanical form unless you
first understood what that mechanics is and what kind of intangible
transition is involved between the figure "2" we see in our minds and
what we'd be looking for inside the digital watch.

>>> Of course this argument makes no practical difference.
>>
>> Au contraire, mon ami. Let me give you a very practical example of the
>> difference it makes. Let's suppose the brain actually functions as a
>> computer analogous to what we use today and the only epistemological
>> problem we face is deciphering its instruction codeset. But instead of
>> conventional bits of uniform size our cerebral computer has bits of
>> variable non uniform size whose size in any particular instance cannot
>> be accurately inferred. How do you approach the problem of intangibles
>> then? Because this is exactly what happens in the brain.
>
>It couldn't be possible that the size of a bit in any particular
>instance could not be accurately inferred. The brain (our computer) must
>do this very function, thus it is possible.

I think individual brains can do it one way or another but I'm not so
sure there is any general method applicable to different brains.

>There are many analogous algorithms that use variable length data and
>they have methods for determining data boundaries. Cracking these
>algorithms may be annoying but its certainly possible.

As above we can definitely say there is some method but whether one
and the same method applies to different brains is problematic.

>>>Is there another perspective, other than mechanical, which would work
>>>here? We are looking for a mechanical answer after all.
>>
>> Another excellent question. There are two ways to do mechanics. The
>> first is the conventional approach we're all familiar with in terms of
>> cumulative mechanics. But there is a second way to do mechanics as
>> well in terms of differences between or among parts. The first is what
>> happens outside the brain and the second is what happens inside the
>> brain that produces the mind and mental effects. Cumultive mechanics
>> correctly describes ordinary material interactions where differential
>> mechanics correctly describes operation of the brain in logical terms.
>
>I have never heard of either term and don't understand how you mean to
>use them. If these are not your terms please post links to some
>references on them, otherwise explain what you're talking about and
>state your assumptions and reasoning.

Ditto my suggestion above. The appended material is brief, around 140
lines.

>> I wrote a couple of interesting posts on the subject a while back on a
>> thread titled "The Sum of Its Parts" (7/25/5, 8/5/5) which describes
>> the mechanical implications involved. I'll repost these if you like.
>
>You're gonna have to, google search is coming up empty.

Appended below.

>>>>>I never meant to say intelligence is intangible.
>>>>
>>>>Yes but I do. I don't see any apparent resolution to the problem of
>>>>intelligence in terms of tangible --> intangible strictly in terms of
>>>>tangibles alone. So unless you're prepared to "see" intelligence in
>>>>some tangible I doubt you can approach the problem successfully
>>>>in terms of tangibles without resort to some intangible mechanics.
>>>
>>>My approach is to define what it is we *want* in terms of the tangible.
>>>That is, what would satisfy our idea of intelligence. Then we ought to
>>>work top-down to satisfy those conditions.
>>
>> Sure but then anywhere you start you don't know will be the top of
>> anything except the problem you set. Besides which I don't see that
>> definition of any "top" tangible gets us any closer to any intangible.
>
>We can't aim to comprehend the intangible as thats impossible by
>definition. Defining a "top" tangible will result in a tangible product
>which is the only way the whole idea makes any sense.

With respect to intangibility let me put it this way: In simple
arithmetic if we have 3 and 4 which we agree are tangible and
subtract 3 from 4 and get 1 which we also agree is tangible, is the
transition itself tangible? I say not because there are lots of other
tangible numbers whose difference is a tangible 1. I say the process
itself is intangible in the sense that differences divorce a tangible
effect - 1 - from its tangible source - 3 and 4.

Now you might have problems with this idea of intangiblity but it's
what I mean in using the term mechanically. Tangible sources and
effects remain connected logically but not physically.

>>>The mind-body problem (as my hasty Wikipedia search reveals) relates to
>>>the relationship between mind and body. The big questions pertain to
>>>whether or not there is some kind of "mind-stuff" or if the entire thing
>>>is an effect of matter within the brain. Questions regarding
>>>consciousness fit in here as well.
>>
>> Yes but the real significance of the mind-body problem is the same
>> tangible-intangible issue faced in cumulative versus differential
>> mechanics. Only the body is considered tangible and mind intangible.
>
>Define any terms you make up before you use them please.

Please bear in mind that you are just coming into a line of reasoning
and ongoing discussion at least several years old. In any event please
review the appended material before we try to hash it out further.

>>>I think for purposes of AI, for us to even say that it is possible for
>>>us to build a (truly) intelligent machine we must assume that regardless
>>>of the mind-body relationship, it must be possible to replicate
>>>intelligent function mechanically. Note that we don't mean to say we are
>>>replicating the human mind, we are intent on creating an /intelligent/
>>>mind, a problem solving device which may little resemble humans.
>>
>> Agreed. The problem I have with tangible definitions is intangible
>> approaches may not appear to produce tangible results initially if
>> tangible measures are used.
>
>Intangible approaches? Approaches incomprehensible by definition? What
>are you talking about..?

See comment above on intangibility.

>>>>>* First and foremost, we are looking for an algorithm. We want this
>>>>>algorithm to run on a computer and exhibit certain properties.
>>>>
>>>>Okay.
>>>>
>>>>>* There may not be a single answer. There are likely many ways in which
>>>>>our constraints can be satisfied. There is no one "intelligence", what
>>>>>we are seeking may one of many different ways of doing the same thing.
>>>>>It is common in Computer Science to see completely different algorithms
>>>>>do the same thing optimally.
>>>>
>>>>I disagree. If we're looking for intelligence we need to find it first
>>>>and then contemplate what intelligence can do artificially.
>>>
>>>Keep in mind the first point (to which you agreed). We are looking for
>>>an algorithm which produces certain effects.
>>
>> I agree except that what you appear to mean by "certain effects" are
>> tangibles whereas what I mean by "certain effects" are intangible and
>> mechanically intangible. Huge difference.
>
>How can we look for effects which we cant comprehend by definition..?

See comment above on intangibility.

>>> That doesn't mean there is
>>>only one such algorithm. You say we need to "find intelligence", but
>>>what makes you think there is only one such "thing"?
>>
>> Because there are only two ways to do mechanics, in cumulative or
>> differential terms. Material interactions work in cumulative terms and
>> sentient operations work in differential, logical terms. What you get
>> though is a compounding of differences between differences and that
>> principle compounded in terms of itself which produces a vast array of
>> superficially different sentient effects whereas material interactions
>> in cumulative terms only produce one kind of material interactions.
>
>Terms again...

Sure.

>>>the same way and function by the same underlying principles? Do we
>>>really know?
>>
>> I think the case is readily demonstrable. Sentient organisms
>> function according to the level of compounding of differences
>> between differences they're organized around.
>
>You're reasoning from assumed positions neither disclosed nor proven.

Ditto my suggestion above.

>>>>>* Our answer is not the silver bullet. Humans are capable of a great
>>>>>variety of skills and tasks, but we should not be overly optimistic with
>>>>>our goals. What we create may only be capable of intelligence within a
>>>>>limited domain. We are looking for generality, but we should not expect
>>>>>to find it right away.
>>>>
>>>>Well here you're making conflicting assumptions: one, that we
>>>>approach the problem top-down and, two, there is no silver bullet.
>>>>If there is no silver bullet there is no top-down. As far as I can see
>>>>top-down requires a starting place in mechanical terms and that
>>>>implies some kind of silver bullet which I would characterize as a
>>>>tangible-intangible transition mechanics.
>>>
>>>When I say "there is no silver bullet" I am talking about how we decide
>>>with what we will be satisfied. For example, here I state a number of
>>>functions that I expect from an intelligence. If we were to create an
>>>algorithm which displayed such functions in a general enough way to be
>>>useful but not general across *all* problems, we should be satisfied.
>>>The practical importance of the point is that we shouldn't discard
>>>seemingly sub-ideal ways of meeting our constraints because they are not
>>>perfectly general (if there is such a thing!)
>>
>> Well I agree there is no silver bullet to the problem of intelligence
>> in tangible terms but only because the problem of intelligence isn't
>> one of tangibles but intangibles and intangible mechanics. But the
>> problem of intangibles and intangible mechanics can only be approached
>> with a silver bullet. So it's really a question of which problem you
>> want to tackle. An armchair is the only instrument needed for the
>> analysis of intangible mechanics.
>
>Intangible mechanics..?

Ditto my suggestion above.

>>>>>* To define what properties we want to have, we need to pick the
>>>>>smallest set of traits with which we will be satisfied. There are many
>>>>>superfluous requirements that get placed on the problem. Ones such as
>>>>>"it must be reproducible in neurons", "it must be scalable", or "it must
>>>>>be built out of elements x, y, and z". If we heap on too many demands we
>>>>>will never find a solution, but then again, if we require too few we
>>>>>will not find an acceptable answer.
>>>>>
>>>>>We can make all of these points without even touching on a definition
>>>>>for intelligence. But if we want to go further, we need to look at the
>>>>>defining traits of intelligence. What would we require? What qualities
>>>>>are we looking for?
>>>>
>>>>Well as far as I can tell the only defining trait for intelligence is
>>>>a tangible-intangible transition mechanics. Without that all you're
>>>>ever going to see are intelligent effects and not intelligence.
>>>
>>>Actually that is all we need. An algorithm displaying intelligent
>>>effects to a sufficient degree would suffice.
>>
>> I disagree unless you have some way to limit intelligent effects. Just
>> approximating some effect to any degree doesn't display intelligence
>> of anything except the programmer designing it.
>
>That argument is against describing, say, Microsoft Word as intelligent
>simply because it is functional. What I am talking about is a machine
>that displays intelligent effects not merely intelligent results. I list
>a few of what I mean below under cognition.

I understand that you do but from the list it looks to me like you're
going more for intelligence that intelligent effects.

>>>>>* Agency. Intelligence is a quality that pertains to an agent. Agency
>>>>>requires that there exist input signals from and output signals to an
>>>>>environment. These signals need to be sufficient for whatever task we
>>>>>want to accomplish.
>>>>>
>>>>>* Cognition. The agent should be capable of...
>>>>> ...accepting an arbitrary goal within the environment.
>>>>> ...accepting relevant information about its environment.
>>>>> ...planning actions that would lead to a more favorable position.
>>>>> ...creating sub-goals and plans for investigating them.
>>>>> ...abstracting, generalizing, and classifying information.
>>>>> ...generating relevant information from basic environmental inputs.
>>>>> ...reasoning about the environment from known information.
>>>>>
>>>>>Most of these requirements are about mental effects. If we look at each
>>>>>item individually it is not impossible to think of algorithms that could
>>>>>do this.
>>>>
>>>>Definitely. Historically though the issue has not been the automation
>>>>of intelligent effects but artificial mechanization of intelligence
>>>>per se. We have all kinds of machines to automate effects but not to
>>>>automate the basic mechanism mainly because we don't know what it is.
>>>
>>>We have machines that automated specific processes. We have no machine
>>>that automates *all* effects of intelligence. That is the goal, the
>>>truly intelligent machine that produces all expected intelligent effects.
>>
>> Well sure. Except the problem is with the "all". You have no way to
>> demonstrate what those are. And the only way to demonstrate those
>> would be with intangible mechanics because that and not tangibles
>> is what defines and limits the effects of intelligence.
>
>Again I don't know what your "intangible mechanics" are but you are
>right, we can't say with certainty today what "all" effects are
>generated by the brain. This does not stop us from creating a wish list
>of the primary, desired effects and replicating them.

Sure. That's exactly what robotics does. Let me ask it this way: Given
all the high level applications we have today can one deduce the
digital computer they run on? Contemporary applications in ai work
this way. They're designed to replicate intelligent functions without
reference to any defined intelligent mechanical platform. I think the
causation is the other way around. We need to understand the defined
intelligent mechanical platform because that's what ultimately defines
intelligent functions and not just ourselves imagining what we'd like
to see.

~v~~

Appendix:


The Sum of Its Parts
-------------

Matter and material interactions are exactly the sum of their parts.
Intelligence, the mind, and mental effects are much more than the sum
of their parts; they are the difference of their parts.

If you doubt this just run the numbers. In the history of the earth
probably no more than 10 billion members of homo s. have ever existed.
At 1/10th ton each, the cumulative weight would run to some 1 billion
tons or probably less than the weight of all the water in the Boxing
Day tsunami of 2004. And yet these 1 billion tons of humanity have
managed to generate vastly more activity than most small planets and
probably hold the potential to generate more activity than most small
stars.

Contrast this with materialist/physicalist fantasies. Taken literally
they would have you believe that the behavior of the 1 billion tons of
humanity ever extant should be analyzed according to f=ma. Behaviorist
dogma is even more uncritically juvenile. They would have you believe
the psychology of humanity is no more than the circumstantial material
consequences analogous to those geological events giving rise to the
Boxing Day tsunami. Yet they worship on because no one has been able
to explain the mechanics of differences underlying sentient behavior.

~v~~

Appendix:

On 05 Aug 2005 04:29:38 GMT, curt@xxxxxxxx (Curt Welch) in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

[. . .]

>Lester was saying something to the extent that the complexity of human
>behavior was evidence that something immaterial was needed to explain it.

Lester was saying nothing of the kind, Curt. Lester was saying
complexity has nothing to do with it. Lester was saying material
interactions are predictable despite being complex because their
interactions are cumulative in nature and sentient interactions are
not material and not predictable not because they're complex but
because they're differential and not cumulative insofar as aggregate
properties are concerned.

I wonder if you actually have any clue what I'm getting on about here,
Curt. When you look at a mass of anything there are two different
aspects to what you're considering: the sum of its parts and the
difference between and among its parts. Let me explain to you in very
basic terms how this matters. It's something that should have been
explained to you in basic mechanics courses but is obviously something
that most technical and empirical people are not aware of.

Let's say you look at two steel balls colliding and you don't know how
to predict their behavior. The first question that comes up is whether
what's involved is only the sum of their parts or differences between
and among their parts. The reason this matters is that if properties
of the balls are only cumulative and not internally differential we
can accumulate all their individual properties (mass, momentum,
energy, etc.) and form equations with them between the two balls.

The reason we can form equations is apparently not that obvious. It's
because of a characteristic of cumulative properties we call
commutation. In other words the ordering of properties doesn't matter
when we add them up because their sum will be the same regardless.

So the same principle of property aggregation holds whether we're
dealing with steel balls or whole planets, stars, and even galaxies.
It doesn't matter how we accumulate all their individual properties
because the sum will come out the same regardless. And a collateral
characteristic of this commutative nature of addition is that as we
add up various individual properties, errors of measurement tend of
offset one another as we accumulate more and more properties.

Now consider the reverse situation where behavior of bodies obeys
internal differential considerations to a much greater extent than
simple cumulative material considerations. The curious thing about
differences is that ordering is critical: differences do not commute.
It makes a huge difference which way differences are considered.

Where I can add A + B + C . . . or B+ C + A . . . in any order I like,
I cannot just willy-nilly subtract A - B - C . . . or B - C - A . . .
in any order I like and come out with the correct answer reflecting
the actual circumstances I'm interested in.

This is basic mechanics. The critical factor in the general history of
mechanics is that someone somewhere around the time of Galileo
recognized that if matter were only cumulative in form, equations
accurately reflecting that commutative nature of material interactions
could be drawn to calculate material interactions in terms of one
another. And this represents the foundation of mechanics in physics
and sciences of material prediction as we know them today.

The fact is if we consider material interactions in cumulative form we
can equate and predict behavior and if we cannot consider interactions
in cumulative terms and have to consider it in differential terms we
cannot. This epistemological law is true of behavior in any body
whether material or sentient. So if we can predict behavior we call
the behavior material because we mean relevant behavioral factors are
cumulative and cumulative factors commute. This includes ordinary
training factors as well for sentient behavior that materialists and
behaviorists are so fond of citing as support for their philosophy.

And if we cannot predict behavior we call the behavior sentient
because we mean the relevant behavioral factors have to be taken
differentially and we have no ability to know what the correct
sequencing or ordering of internal differences may be. And this would
include material interactions as well whose behavior is not understood
and assumed to be a manifestation of divine supernatural will.

This is what limits our ability to predict or describe the behavior
controlled by differences accurately and not the fact that it is based
on material elements within it. And this is the reason I have placed
such emphasis on the issue. It's not a question of complexity and
accuracy of measurement. The ordering of differences is what matters
because differences do not commute and sums do. And until you can
understand this one different elementary mechanical characteristic of
sums versus differences there is no chance you will ever come to any
mechanical understanding of what's involved in sentient mechanics.

I'm confident you remember the thousands of posts on my Epistemology
201: The Science of Science thread. And even if you didn't understand
everything flying back and forth between me and the mathematikers, let
me just comment that almost every conflict there took place because
most mathematikers don't understand this basic mechanical principle.

Modern math has surrendered its birthright of mathematics in general
in order to pursue the equatable, predictive certainty of commutative
addition rather than take into account non commutative differences.
Hell their whole arithmetic is based on addition. Their entire system
of cardinal enumeration is based on addition and their treatment of
sets entirely neglects and misrepresents non commutative properties.
And they just couldn't bear to face the idea that every aspect of
their precious predictive commutative edifice is in fact based on non
commutative differences in strict mechanical terms.

~v~~

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: The problem of intelligence.
    ... If we proceed empirically by studying the process in others we have to proceed via tangibles to study an intangible. ... Our study may not succeed but the success of studying tangible effects will not shed light on the mechanics of an intangible process. ... I agree that simply prospecting for intelligence within the brain is hopeless without some mechanical recognition of what it is we're looking for and I've argued against the neurological approach in ai for many years for exactly this reason. ... I see it as a measurable tangible which doesn't shed light on the mechanics of intangibles. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: The problem of intelligence.
    ... what most people refer to as intangibles because we can't find the ... images in the brain. ... tangibles must be intangible. ... It's a problem in mechanics not philosophy. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: The problem of intelligence.
    ... Those mental effects are what most people refer to as intangibles because we can't find the images in the brain. ... So if the brain is tangible then the imaging of tangibles must be intangible. ... But I'm definitely categorically opposed to defining intelligence anyway we want just so we can get on with mechanizing the definition without actually defining the mechanics of intelligence just so we can say we've made progress on some arbitrary definition. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: The problem of intelligence.
    ... >>>we have to proceed via tangibles to study an intangible. ... >> That's only a valid position if intangibles were not tangible. ... >> universe (and the mind) led to the common false belief that intangibles ... The mind and the brain are one and the same. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: The problem of intelligence.
    ... > we have to proceed via tangibles to study an intangible. ... > the intangible process itself and not tangible effects. ... That's only a valid position if intangibles were not tangible. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)