Re: The skill of learning skills.

On Fri, 06 Jan 2006 20:40:44 GMT, Risujin <risujin@xxxxxxxxxxx> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>Everyone has their own ideas for what an intelligence is. We need to
>>>pick the definitions that seem reasonable and strive to create something
>>>which fits the description.
>>
>> This seems to be pretty much exactly what everyone has been doing
>> which hasn't led to anything more than robotics. Perhaps we should
>> first stop to ask ourselves what the paradox of intelligence is and
>> solve that problem before simply defining it one way or another.
>
>You keep mentioning the "paradox of intelligence". What exactly are you
>talking about? Where is the paradox?

Nothing special about the term. We might say "puzzle" instead of
"paradox". I think the reason I used "paradox" is that no one seems
able to say exactly what "intelligence" means except metaphorically.

>>>On the contrary we would have created a definition for what we're
>>>looking for. Instead of searching for that warm and fuzzy "aha!" feeling
>>>we'd have a concrete means of judging our progress. The better our
>>>definition the better we can judge our progress. That is what I mean by
>>>tightening.
>>
>> Except plenty of people have already come up with definitions of what
>> they're looking for which provide a concrete means of judging progress
>> without creating intelligence. I thought it's what you're complaining
>> about. Maybe you should ask yourself whether intelligence is concrete
>> to begin with?
>
>What do you mean by concrete here? Are you asking whether or not we can
>measure intelligence?

No. I'm asking what you and others mean by intelligence in mechanical
terms? You used "concrete" to specify a gauge for progress in solving
the problem of intelligence. So what do you mean by "concrete"? If you
mean something like an arbitrary gauge of whatever you take to measure
intelligence then I'd have to ask whether that "concrete" gauge really
measures intelligence in mechanical terms?

>>>No amount of defining will give us the answer outright but you shouldn't
>>>expect it to.
>>
>> Of course I don't expect it to. I thought you expected it to. If you
>> don't expect intelligence to fall out of what you propose then it
>> falls under the heading robotics not artificial intelligence.
>
>Does a compass get you to your destination? No, you still have to travel
>there yourself. Nothing would "fall out" of our intelligence "compass",
>but it is essential for getting to our destination.

Not really since there are other ways to approximate directions.
Besides you're only asserting technique by analogy. We know what
compasses measure and why and how. We don't have any comparable
mechanical understanding for intelligence. We have and use various
measures without understanding how or why they apply.

>>>Actually there is an important difference. We repleace "we know it when
>>>..." with "the more ... the more intelligent". Do you see the
>>>distinction?
>>
>> What I see is a terminological expansion instead of a scientific
>> reduction. Calling something intelligent doesn't make it intelligence.
>
>So you're categorically opposed to defining intelligence? How will you
>"know it when you see it" if you don't know what you're looking for?

Well I consider your original argument against "we'll know it when
we see it" techniques for assessing artificial intelligence perfectly
valid. And I am definitely not categorically opposed to defining
intelligence. But I'm definitely categorically opposed to defining
intelligence anyway we want just so we can get on with mechanizing
the definition without actually defining the mechanics of intelligence
just so we can say we've made progress on some arbitrary definition.
Your original point was valid. It's just that we don't avoid your
original objection by further qualifying "we'll know it when we see
it" with some added tangible property such as "skill" "behavior"
"neurology" or "evolve" because you're still caught up in the "we'll
know it when we see it" part of the process which you correctly
objected to.

>> All you're really doing is replacing one paradox - intelligence -
>> which you can't solve with another - skill, training, etc. - which
>> you think you can solve but ultimately will not solve the problem
>> of intelligence itself. And my question to you is how you expect to
>> "see" the "it" - intelligence - in whatever descriptive analogy you
>> substitute especially if the "it" can't be seen in the first place.
>
>Do you actually know what a paradox is?

Well I'm not stuck on the term. If you want to call it a puzzle
instead go ahead. It's still an unkown in mechanical terms and it
seems to produce certain paradoxical effects such as the mind and
mental effects not generally evident in material interactions.

>I make a definition of intelligence precisely because I need something
>(the "it") to be tangible and measurable. My skills definition might
>seem too abstract, but if we pick a limited domain we *could* turn it
>into a quantitative measure.

Sure but the question here is why exactly you expect intelligence to
be tangible if it produces intangible effects such as the mind and
mental effects? So either you're stuck trying to substitute tangible
effects for intelligence so you can measure them or you have to
explain how it is that intelligence is mechanical yet intangible. I
thought your original objection was that simply saying "we'll know
it when we see it" was unsatisfactory because we don't know what
we're looking at in mechanical terms. But adding further tangible
qualifications to a tangible "we'll know it when we seet it" doesn't
make the effect itself or it's explanation tangible.

I suppose I read your original objection as opposed to tangibility for
intelligence. So I have to ask whether you would expect to be able to
"see" intelligence at all and if so in what terms?It's one thing to be
able "see" various behavioral, neural, and skilled tangible effects of
intelligence without being able to "see" the thing itself in tangible
terms. So if you don't expect to be able to "see" intelligence in such
tangible terms then all you can really expect to be able to do is list
a whole slew of intelligent effects and mechanize them artificially.

>>> Its the difference between a compass that points at the
>>>north pole and a light that turns on when youre there.
>>
>> Then my question here is how do you know one is more intelligent
>> than the other and "the more - a light turns on when you're there -
>> the more intelligent"?
>
>Your question here doesn't make sense.

Well if your point is that intelligence in itself is a tangible thing
then I can see that the more the better as far as measurement is
concerned. What I don't see is how or whether tangible measures
can have any bearing if intelligence is mechanically intangible. I
doubt very much that intelligence itself is a tangible thing even
though it produces tangible effects. But simply substituting tangible
things for intelligence simply because they're measurable doesn't
have any bearing on whether or not intelligence is tangible. Nor
would it have any bearing on figuring out what intelligence is if it
is intangible. And that is the fundamental issue requiring a solution
before intelligence can be mechanized artificially or otherwise.

~v~~

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