Re: Qualia Question



Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
> >> > Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
> > >> >
> > >> > > It is not clear the extent to which this is true, but I suspect
> > >> > > that
> > >> there
> > >> > > is some truth to it. IOW, we frequently observe our own behavior
> > >> > > (and
> > >> this
> > >> > > is complicated - frequently what we describe is the function of
> > >> > > behavior
> > >> > > rather than the movements themselves: i.e., "What are you doing?"
> > >> > > "I'm
> > >> > > opening the door.") and we frequently observe our
> > >> > > publicly-available
> > >> > > behavior. However, sometimes we may observe fragments of responses,
> > >> > > or
> > >> > > low-intensity responses that are not "movement" at all, but are
> > >> > > still
> > >> > > behavior.
> > >> >
> > >> > But we don't observer them *as* behaviour. This proposal falls into
> > >> > exactly the same hole as "the way things seem is just neural
> > >> > activity".
> > >>
> > >> No, the difference is that, obviously, we CAN observe behavior.
> > >
> > > That doesn't mean it is the only thing we can do ?
> >
> > We can come to observe anything for which we have relevant sensory
> > physiology. This appears to exclude many of the events that mediate
> > behavior - your so-called "internal states."
> >
>
> 1Z: How do you know we can't "observe" internal states ?
>
>
>
> GS: By observing the fact that sensation requires sensory neurons. You can't
> "feel your brain."

And if I could, I would only be able to feel heat, pain , pressure and
so on.
Not thoughts and feelings.

> 1Z: Surely
> consciousness
> is surely self-awareness by definition.
>
>
>
> GS: One meaning is, and it is the meaning I am talking about. And as I have
> said, what we are aware of is our own behavior.
>



>
> 1Z: And if we brains[]
>
>
>
> GS: I don't know about you, but I'm a person.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 1Z: []did have a
> self-awareness module, we would expect it to work differently from
> external
> sense -- which of course is exactly what it appears to do.
>
>
>
> GS: Funny, it doesn't appear that way to me.

I mean "appear" in the sense of ..well...appear. Naive, uninterpreted
experince.

"I am happy" and "I am laughing" feel different.

> It appears to work exactly like
> "exteroception."

Meaning that you have convinced yourself it does. What you eman is
"I believe" not "it appears".

> Why would you expect that introspection would be
> fundamentally different than "exteroception"?

Because it feels different. Introspection isn't like looking at yourslf
in the mirror. Of course I am starting with prima-facie facts, rather
than
with a dogma about how things *must* work.


> 1Z: Brains don't
> read themselves the way brain-scanners do. Why should they ?
>
>
>
> GS: My claim is that it is misleading to say that brains "read themselves"
> at all.

Which is equivalent to saying there is no such thing as consciousness.

> 1Z: The only basis I can think of for asserting that brains don't obeserve
> themselves is that there isn't any obvious, conventional sense-organ
> dedicated to the task.
>
>
>
> GS: A pretty reasonable basis it seems to me.

Once you start using that theory to overturn facts, it becomes
unreasonable.


> 1Z: But maybe there is a non-obvious unconventional
> one.
> In fact, some neurologists claim that they have identified the
> consciousness module.
>
>
>
> GS: The term "neurologist" is probably misplaced here (it implies an MD
> doing clinical work) but it is certainly true that cognitive neuro"scientists"
> make a lot of claims. The issues here, however, involve the underlying
> assumptions of cognitive "science," not the facts that appear in the Results
> sections (although there are times when it is difficult to tell exactly what
> was measured) of papers.

They involve the underlying assumptions of beaviourism too.

> >
> > >
> > >> Here, I'll
> > >> prove it: I, Glen Sizemore, do solemnly swear that I am responding to
> > >> your
> > >> post. Am I not observing my behavior? On the other hand, it makes no
> > >> sense
> > >> to say we feel physiology,
> > >
> > > Who said "feel physiology" ?
> >
> > You used a phrase something like "monitor internal states."
> >
> > >
> > > We can build computers that monitor themselves, why can't brains montor
> > > themselves ?
> >
> >
> >
> > Because, as Skinner was fond of saying, "We don't have nerves going to the
> > right places."
> >
>
> 1Z: Many neuroscientists nowadays disagree with him.
>
>
>
> GS: I'm painfully aware of that fact.
>
> >
> > >Note that the issue of introspection being different from
> > > observing behaviour is different from the qualia/EG issue.
> >
> > EG?
> >
>
> "Explanatory gap".
>
> >
> > We could
> > > still
> > > introspect even if we stopped having qualia.
> > >
> > >> unless observing behavior is the same as
> > >> "observing physiology."
> >
> > You mean in the real Universe?
>
> 1Z: So your claim is ultimately based on the science of Skinner's day ?
>
>
>
> GS: There have been few important conceptual revolutions since Skinner's
> day.

But the claim that the brain just isn't wired up to read itslef is
partly emprical. OC, it is also partly conceptual, in that you need
your
dogmatic assumption that consciousness must be the same as sensation.

> And it is conceptualization of the subject matter that is, IMO, at
> issue.
>
>
>
> "1Z" <peterdjones@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> news:1121342159.152258.154600@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >
> >
> > Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
> >> "1Z" <peterdjones@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> >> news:1121095856.047115.92420@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> > Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
> >> >> "1Z" <peterdjones@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> >> >> news:1120910510.539342.310010@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> >> > Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
> >> >> >

.

Relevant Pages

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