OT - David Petraeus: Mass Murderer, Terminal Bore, and Plagiarist

(Rather long but worthwhile insight into just how the U.S. Nazis
operate.)

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Pilfered Scholarship Devastates General Petraeus's Counterinsurgency
Manual
by DAVID PRICE
CounterPunch
10/30/07

[Editors' note: This expose of the stolen scholarship in the Army's
new manual on counterinsurgency to which General David Petraeus has
attached his name also runs in our current newsletter sent by US mail
or as a pdf to our newsletter subscribers. Normally material in our
newsletter does not run on the CounterPunch website. In the belief
that David Price's story merits the widest and swiftest circulation,
not only as regards the "borrowings" from unacknowledged sources but
also the prostitution of anthropology in evil military enterprises we
re making an exception in this case. AC / JSC]

If I could sum up the book in just a few words, it would be: "Be
polite, be professional, be prepared to kill."
--John Nagl, The Daily Show.

Last December, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps published a new
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (No. 3-24). In policy circles, the
Manual became an artifact of hope, signifying the move away from the
crude logic of "shock and awe" toward calculations that rifle-toting
soldiers can win the hearts and minds of occupied Iraq through a new
appreciation of cultural nuance.

Some view the Manual as containing plans for a new intellectually
fueled "smart bomb," and it is being sold to the public as a scholarly
based strategic guide to victory in Iraq. In July, this contrivance
was bolstered as the University of Chicago Press republished the
Manual in a stylish, olive drab, faux-field ready edition, designed to
slip into flack jackets or Urban Outfitter accessory bags. The Chicago
edition includes the original forward by General David Petraeus and
Lt. General James Amos, with a new forward by Lt. Col. John Nagl and
introduction by Sarah Sewell, of Harvard's JFK School of Government.
Chicago's republication of the Field Manual spawned a minor media
orgy, and Lt. Col. Nagl, a counterinsurgency expert, became the
Manual's poster boy, appearing on NPR, ABC News, NBC, and the pages of
the NYT, Newsweek, and other publications, pitching the Manual as the
philosophical expression of Petraeus' intellectual strategy for
victory in Iraq.

The media buzz surrounding the Manual maintains it is a rare work of
applied scholarship. Robert Bateman writes in the Chicago Tribune that
it is "probably the most important piece of doctrine written in the
past 20 years," crediting this success to the high academic standards
and integrity that the Army War College historian, Conrad Crane,
brought to the project. Bateman touts Crane's devotion to using an
"honest and open peer review" process, and his reliance on a team of
top scholars to draft the Manual. This team included "current or
former members of one of the combat branches of the Army or Marine
Corps". As well as being combat veterans, "the more interesting aspect
of this group was that almost all of them had at least a master's
degree, and quite a few could add 'doctor' to their military rank and
title as well. At the top of that list is the officer who saw the need
for a new doctrine, then-Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, Ph.D."

The Manual's PR campaign has been extraordinary. In a Daily Show
interview, John Nagl hammed it up in uniform with Jon Stewart, but
amidst the banter Nagl stayed on mission and described how Gen.
Petraeus collected a "team of writers [who] produced the [Manual]
strategy that General Petraeus is implementing in Iraq now." When Jon
Stewart commented on the speed at which the Manual was produced, Nagl
remarked that this was "very fast for an Army field manual; the
process usually takes a couple of years"; but for Nagl this still was
"not fast enough". The first draft of each chapter was produced in two
months before being reworked at an Army conference at Ft. Leavenworth.
Most academics know that bad things can happen when marginally skilled
writers must produce ambitious amounts of writing in short time
periods; sometimes the only resulting calamities are grammatical
abominations, but in other instances the pressures to perform lead to
shoddy academic practices. Neither of these outcomes is especially
surprising among desperate people with limited skills -- but Petraeus
and others leading the charge apparently did not worry about such
trivialities: they had to crank out a new strategy to calm growing
domestic anger at military failures in Iraq.

Last year, the anthropologist Roberto González determined that
anthropologists Montgomery McFate and David Kilcullen authored
sections of the Manual and contributed to new Iraq counterinsurgency
programs, relying on embedded military ethnographers in "Human Terrain
System" teams, using anthropologists to assist troops making judgments
in the field, employing cultural knowledge as a weapon of
"pacification." Drs. McFate and Kilcullen have become media darlings.
Kilcullen took on warrior-anthropologist status in last year's
uncritical New Yorker profile by George Packer; profiles of McFate in
the New Yorker, the S.F. Chronicle Magazine, and More (a glossy
women's magazine "celebrating women 40+") sculpt images of Kilcullen
and McFate as heroic soldier-thinkers, uncompromisingly harnessing
knowledge for the state's agenda. This media campaign provides McFate
with frequent opportunities to characterize her critics publicly (as
she recently did in the Wall Street Journal) as having no ideas about
the military beyond "waving a big sign outside the Pentagon saying,
'you suck.'" While such outbursts make Dr. McFate seem like a
character right out of Team America, the military and intelligence
community takes her and her work very seriously.

Montgomery McFate holds a Harvard law degree and a Yale anthropology
Ph.D. and has worked for various organizations linked to U.S. military
and intelligence agencies, including RAND, the Office of Naval
Intelligence, and the Institute for Defense Analysis' Joint Advanced
Warfighting Program. She is currently the U.S. Army's Human Terrain
System's Senior Social Science Adviser. McFate's current role as
Senior Social Science Adviser for the Human Terrain program
demonstrates how the military is implementing the Manual's approach to
the use of culture as a battlefield weapon. Human Terrain Teams are
now embedding anthropologists with troops operating in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Some Human Terrain anthropologists have publicly
identified themselves (the anthropologist Marcus Griffin even writes a
blog on limited elements of Human Terrain work while working in Iraq),
while others do not disclose their identity. Human Terrain
anthropologists use ethnographic knowledge to advise and inform troops
in the field while traveling with armed escorts and are, in some
instances, themselves armed and wearing uniforms, yet McFate maintains
that these anthropologists are in compliance with basic
anthropological ethical standards, mandating that participants in
research projects participate under conditions of voluntary informed
consent.

In a recent exchange with Dr. McFate, Col. John Agoglia and Lt. Col.
Edward Villacres on the Diane Rehm Show, I pressed McFate for an
explanation of how voluntary ethical informed consent was produced in
environments dominated by weapons. In response, McFate assured me that
was not a problem because "indigenous local people out in rural
Afghanistan are smart, and they can draw a distinction between a
lethal unit of the U.S. military and a non-lethal unit." It also
remains unclear how Human Terrain Teams comply with basic ethical
standards, mandating that their research does not result in harm
coming to the individuals they study as a result of their work.

Human Terrain research gathers data that help inform what Assistant
Undersecretary of Defense John Wilcox recently described as the
military's "need to map Human Terrain across the Kill Chain". The
disclosure that anthropologists are producing knowledge for those
directing the "kill chain" raises serious questions about the state of
anthropology.

The Secrets of Chapter Three

Montgomery McFate and an unnamed "military intelligence specialist" co-
wrote the Manual's chapter 3, the Manual's longest and the key chapter
on "Intelligence in Counterinsurgency." Chapter 3 introduces basic
social science views of elements of culture that underlie the Manual's
approach to teaching counterinsurgents how to weaponize the specific
indigenous cultural information they encounter in specific theaters of
battle. General Petraeus is betting that troops working alongside
Human Terrain System teams can apply the Manual's principles to
stabilize and pacify war-torn Iraq.

When I read an online copy of the Manual last winter, I was
unimpressed by its watered-down anthropological explanations, but
having researched anthropological contributions to the Second World
War, I was familiar with such oversimplifications. But some in the
military found the Counterinsurgency Manual to be revolutionary.
McFate claims the Manual is so radical that it "is considered 'Zen
tinged' not just by the media, but also by many members of the
military who felt that the Manual, and chapter 3 in particular, was
'too innovative' and 'too politically correct.'" Like any manual, the
Counterinsurgency Field Manual is written in the dry, detached voice
of basic instruction. But as I re-read Chapter 3 a few months ago, I
found my eye struggling through a crudely constructed sentence and
then suddenly being graced with a flowing line of precise prose:

"A ritual is a stereotyped sequence of activities involving
gestures, words, and objects performed to influence supernatural
entities or forces on behalf of the actors' goals and
interest." (Counterinsurgency Manual, 3-51)

The phrase "stereotyped sequence" leapt off the page. Not only was it
out of place, but it sparked a memory. I knew that I'd read these
words years ago. With a little searching, I discovered that this
unacknowledged line had been taken from a 1972 article written by the
anthropologist Victor Turner, who brilliantly wrote that religious
ritual is:

"a stereotyped sequence of activities involving gestures, words,
and objects, performed in a sequestered place, and designed to
influence preternatural entities or forces on behalf of the actors'
goals and interests." (See full citation in the concluding
"comparison" section of this article.)

The Manual simplified Turner's poetic voice, trimming a few big words
and substituting "supernatural" for "preternatural". The Manual used
no quotation marks, attribution, or citations to signify Turner's
authorship of this barely altered line. Having encountered students
passing off the work of other scholars as their own, I know that such
acts are seldom isolated occurrences; this single kidnapped line of
Turner got me wondering if the Manual had taken other unattributed
passages. While I did not perform exhaustive searches, with a little
searching in Chapter 3 alone I found about twenty passages showing
either direct use of others' passages without quotes, or heavy
reliance on unacknowledged source materials.

In the concluding "comparison" section of this article are listed some
of the unattributed passages I identified in the Manual's third
chapter, along with the unacknowledged sources that I tracked down.
These examples show a consistent pattern of unacknowledged use in this
chapter. Any author can accidentally drop a quotation mark from a work
during the production process, but the extent and consistent pattern
of this practice in this Manual is more than common editorial
carelessness. The cumulative effect of such non-attributions is
devastating to the Manual's academic integrity.

The inability of this chapter's authors to come up with their own
basic definitions of such simple sociocultural concepts as "race,"
"culture," "ritual," or "social structure" not only raises questions
about the ethics of the authors but also furnishes a useful measure of
the Manual and its authors' weak intellectual foundation.

Other sections of the Manual have unacknowledged borrowings from other
sources. The anthropologist Roberto González found that the Manual's
Appendix A was "inspired by T.E. Lawrence, who in 1917 published the
piece 'Twenty-seven articles' for Arab Bulletin, the intelligence
journal of Great Britain's Cairo-based Arab Bureau." González compared
several passages of Lawrence with Kilcullen's Appendix A, and found
parallel constructions where paragraphs were reworded but followed set
formations between the two texts . González observed that while these
parallel constructions can be seen, "Lawrence is never mentioned in
the appendix. González shows that Kilcullen's other written work makes
a passing reference, but does not acknowledge the degree to which
Lawrence's ideas and style have been influential."

Sources for the Manual's pilfered passages range from the British
sociologist Anthony Giddens' introductory level sociology textbook to
the writings of American symbolic anthropologist (and World War Two
conscientious objector) Victor Turner, to an online study guide for an
MIT anthropology course, to Fred Plog and Daniel Bates' anthropology
textbook Cultural Anthropology, to the writings of Max Weber.

Chapter Three's hidden debt to the great German sociologist Max Weber
is intriguing. Weber had his own armchair dalliance with
counterinsurgency when he supported the military's suppression of
German radicals' 1919 uprising, proclaiming, "Liebknecht belongs in
the madhouse and Rosa Luxemburg in the zoological gardens!" Weber's
views on "power and authority" are reproduced in the body of the
Manual, without quotation marks, as if they were the words of
Petraeus' staff (see Comparisons section at the end of this artilcle),
while section 3-63 is organized following Weber's tripartite division
of authority structures: "Rational-Legal Authority," "Charismatic
Authority" and "Traditional Authority."

In some sentences, the Manual so directly follows the vocabulary and
structure of sentences in other works that the sources can easily be
identified. For example, the Manual's (3-26) entry for "ethnic groups"
says:

"An ethnic group is a human community whose learned cultural
practices, language, history, ancestry, or religion distinguish them
from others. Members of ethnic groups see themselves as different from
other groups in a society and are recognized as such by others."

Elements of this definition closely echo a passage in Anthony Giddens'
2006 Introduction to Sociology text (5th ed, p. 487), discussing
ethnicity:

"Different characteristics may serve to distinguish ethnic groups
from one another, but the most usual are language, history, or
ancestry (real or imagined), religions and Members of ethnic groups
see themselves as culturally distinct from other groups in a society,
and are seen by those other groups to be so in return."

Several sections of the Manual are identical to entries in online
encyclopedia sources like www.answers.com. For example, the Manual's
definition of "language" is the same as that on http://www.answers.com/topic/duration-poem-4).

The most damning element of the Manual's reliance on unattributed
sources is that the Manual includes a bibliography listing of over 100
sources, yet not a single source I have identified is included. My
experience with students trying to pass off the previously published
work of others as their own is that they invariably omit citation of
the bibliographic sources they copy, so as not to draw attention to
them. Even without using bibliographic citations, the Manual could
have just used quotes and named sources in the same standard
journalistic format used in this article, but no such attributions
were used in these instances.

The few published critical examinations of the Manual focus on the
text's provenience and philosophical roots. In The Nation, Tom Hayden
links the Manual to the philosophical roots of U.S. Indian Wars,
reservation policies, and the Vietnam War's Phoenix Program. In the
Royal Anthropological Institute's journal Anthropology Today, Roberto
González criticizes McFate and Kilcullen's contributions to the
Manual, observing that the Manual "reads like a manual for indirect
colonial rule." That a press as drenched in "reflexive" critiques of
colonialism as Chicago would publish such a manual is an ironic
testament to just how depoliticized postmodernism's salon bound
critiques have become; and a recent New York Times op-ed by Chicago
anthropologist Richard Shweder indicates a stance of inaction from
which the travesties of Human Terrain can be lightly critiqued while
anthropologists are urged not to declare themselves as being "counter-
counterinsurgency".

Role of the Chicago University Press

The role of University of Chicago Press in bringing the Manual to a
broader audience is curious. That such shoddy scholarship passed so
easily and so briskly through the well-guarded gates of this press
raises questions concerning Chicago's interest in rushing out this
faux academic work. Ramming a book through the production process at
an academic press in about half a year's time is a blitzkrieg
requiring a serious focus of will. There was more than a casual
interest in getting this book to market -- whether it was simply a
shrewd recognition of market forces, or reflected political concerns
or commitments. The Press is enjoying robust sales of a hot title (it
was one of Amazon's top 100 in September); but it did not consider the
damage to the Press' reputation that could follow its association with
this deeply tarnished service manual for Empire.

To highlight the Manual's scholarly failures is not to hold it to some
over-demanding, external standard of academic integrity. However,
claims of academic integrity are the very foundation of the Manual's
promotional strategy. Somewhere along the line, Petraeus' doctorate
became more important than his general's stars, touted by Petraeus'
claque in the media as tokening a shift from Bush's "bring 'em on"
cowboy shoot-out to a nuanced thinking-man's war.

The University of Chicago Press acquisitions editor, John Tryneski,
told me the Manual went through a peer review process, but there are
unusual dynamics in reviewing an already published work whose authors
are not just unknown (common in the peer review process), but
essentially unknowable. Tryneski acknowledged that peer reviewers came
from policy and think tank circles. When I asked Tryneski if there had
been any internal debate over the decision by the Press to disseminate
military doctrine, he said there were some discussions and then,
without elaboration, changed the subject, arguing that the Press
viewed this publication more along the lines of the republication of a
key historic document. This might make sense if this was an historic
document, not a component of a campaign being waged against the
American people by a Pentagon, surging to convince a skeptical
American public that Bush hasn't already lost the war in Iraq.

The significance of the University of Chicago Press' republication of
the Manual must be seen in the context of the Pentagon's domestic
propaganda campaign to generate support for an indefinite U.S.
presence in Iraq. Here is an "independent" academic press playing
point guard in the production of pseudo-scholarly political
propaganda. As the Middle East scholar Steve Niva recently suggested
to me, "General Petraeus' counterinsurgency in Iraq has failed, but
his domestic campaign for American hearts and minds is succeeding in
textbook fashion; the strategy is to weaken the demand for withdrawal
by dividing insurgents (anti-war activists) from the general
population (American public)."

That militaries commandeer food, wealth, and resources to serve the
needs of war is a basic rule of warfare -- as old as war itself.
Thucydides, Herodotus and other ancient historians record standard
practices of seizing slaves and food to feed armies on the move; and
the history of warfare finds similar confiscations to keep armies on
their feet. But the requirements of modern warfare go far beyond the
needs of funds and sustenance; military and intelligence agencies also
require knowledge, and these agencies commandeer ideas for use to
their own purposes in ways not intended by their authors.

Pressganging scholars to fight dirty wars

The requisitioning of anthropological knowledge for military
applications has occurred in colonial contexts, world wars and proxy
wars. After World War II, the Harvard anthropologist Carleton Coon
recounted how he produced a 40-page text on Moroccan propaganda for
the OSS by taking pages of text straight from his textbook, Principles
of Anthropology. "[He] padded it with enough technical terms to make
it ponderous and mysterious, since [he] had found out in the academic
world that people will express much more awe and admiration for
something complicated which they do not quite understand than for
something simple and clear."

The most egregious known instance of the military's recycling of an
anthropological text occurred in 1962, when the U.S. Department of
Commerce secretly, and without authorization or permission from the
author, translated into English from French the anthropologist Georges
Condominas' ethnographic account of Montagnard village life in the
central highlands of Vietnam, Nous Avons Mangé la Forêt. The Green
Berets weaponized the document in the field. The military's uses for
this ethnographic knowledge were obvious, as assassination campaigns
tried to hone their skills and learn to target village leaders. For
years, neither publisher nor author knew this work had been stolen,
translated, and reprinted for militarized ends. In 1971, Condominas
described his anger at this abuse of his humanistic work, saying:

"How can one accept, without trembling with rage, that this work,
in which I wanted to describe in their human plenitude these men who
have so much to teach us about life, should be offered to the
technicians of death -- of their death! ...You will understand my
indignation when I tell you that I learned about the 'pirating' [of my
book] only a few years after having the proof that Srae, whose
marriage I described in Nous Avons Mangé la Forêt, had been tortured
by a sergeant of the Special Forces in the camp of Phii Ko.'"

Today, anthropologists serving on militarily "embedded" Human Terrain
Teams study Iraqis with claims that they are teaching troops how to
recognize and protect noncombatants. But as Bryan Bender reports in
the Boston Globe, "one Pentagon official likened [Human Terrain
anthropologists] to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support project during the Vietnam War. That effort helped identify
Vietnamese suspected as communists and Viet Cong collaborators; some
were later assassinated by the United States." This chilling
revelation clarifies the role that Pentagon officials envision for
anthropologists in today's counterinsurgency campaigns.

McFate's Anthropology

The military and intelligence community loves McFate and her programs
not because her thinking is innovative -- but because, beyond
information on specific manners and customs of lands they are
occupying, the simplistic views of culture she provides tell them what
they already know. This has long been a problem faced by
anthropologists working in such confined military settings. My
research examining the frustrations and contributions of World War II
era anthropologists identifies a recurrent pattern in which
anthropologists with knowledge flowing against the bureaucratic
precepts of military and intelligence agencies faced often impossible
institutional barriers. They faced the choice of either coalescing
with ingrained institutional views and advancing within these
bureaucracies, or enduring increasing frustrations and marginalized
status. Such wartime frustrations led Alexander Leighton to conclude
in despair that "the administrator uses social science the way a drunk
uses a lamppost, for support rather than illumination." In this sense,
Montgomery McFate's selective use of anthropology -- which ignores
anthropological critiques of colonialism, power, militarization,
hegemony, warfare, cultural domination and globalization -- provides
the military with just the sort of support, rather than illumination,
that they seek. In large part, what the military wants from
anthropology is to offer basic courses in local manners so that they
can get on with the job of conquest. The fact that military
anthropologists appear disengaged from questioning conquest exposes
the fundamental problem with military anthropology.

I'm sure that Chapter Three's authors had no idea the Manual would
receive such public scrutiny; and that notions of University of
Chicago Press distribution were not on the horizon when these
identified passages were lifted. It remains unclear how these
unattributed passages entered the Manual. If the Army or the Chicago
Press care about scholarship, they will conduct an investigation and
make public their findings. There's plenty of blame to go around. It
would be simple to blame Gen. Petraeus and the University of Chicago
Press for running such a sloppy operation, but Montgomery McFate's
areas of expertise are those consistently coinciding with the
chapter's pilfered passages. I have such high respect for Jon Nagl's
academic work and sense of propriety that I cannot imagine his knowing
involvement in such sloppy work, but his name, as a significant
element in the public face of this project, is sullied. These
commandeered passages make curious McFate's insistence that "it is the
nature of knowledge to escape the bonds of its creator; to believe
otherwise is to persist in a supreme naivety about the nature of
knowledge production and distribution." We are left to wonder how much
unattributed "escaped" knowledge appears in classified documents, now
sequestered beyond the public's view.

In one sense, the particular details of how the Manual came to reprint
the unacknowledged writings of scholars do not matter. If quotation
marks and attributions were removed by someone other than the
chapter's authors, the end result is the same as if the authors
intentionally took this material. The silence on the reproduction of
these passages, the lack of any authorial erratum, and the failure to
add quotation marks even when Chicago Press republished the Manual
seems to argue against the likelihood of a simple editorial mix-up,
but who knows. The ways that the processes producing the Manual so
easily abused the work of others inform us of larger dynamics in play,
when scholars and academic presses lend their reputations, and
surrender control, to projects mixing academic with military goals.

With hindsight, Dr. McFate replies to queries and critiques of the
Manual's scholarship seem odd. In response to González's critique in
Anthropology Today of the Manual's weak anthropological base, McFate
framed the Manual as "military doctrine, not an academic treatise" and
inexplicably proclaimed that "doctrine does not have footnotes." But
McFate knows that the Manual has both footnotes and citations where it
suits its purpose (for example see footnote on Pages 53, 151, 188, of
the Chicago Press printing; and see citations on 6-85, 6,87, etc.; and
attributions for use of copyright materials on Chicago version, Pages
151, 188). One measure of the Manual's status as an extrusion of
political ideology rather than scholarly labor is that when quotes and
attributions are used, they are frequently deployed in the context of
quoting the apparently sacred words of generals and other military
figures -- thereby, denoting not only differential levels of respect
but different treatment of who may and may not be quoted without
attribution. Last August, I emailed McFate in Afghanistan to confirm
that she had co-authored the Manual's Chapter 3. Unprompted, she
replied, "Words, phrases and concepts that I was attached to were
removed by other authors or the editors to make it more accessible to
general readers. Also, all my footnotes were removed (naturally)."
McFate listed words, phrases, concepts, and footnotes as removed
elements of text, with no mention made of the removal of quotation
marks or narrative attributions. Rather than providing shielding, Dr.
McFate's disclaimers make me wonder if she was aware that somewhere
along the line unacknowledged academic texts had been pilfered for
reasons of state.

In recent years, McFate and other militarized anthropologists have
been demanding more academic respectability. While some in this group
are producing interesting quality studies of the military and
intelligence community, the Manual shows the sort of low quality work
that can pass as "innovative" uses of anthropology for the military.
Chapter three reads like the work of lazy C students, taking phrases
and sentences promiscuously from various sources, cobbling them
together into a sort of Cliffs Notes version of anthropology, which
the University of Chicago Press has now laundered into a book posing
as an object of academic respectability.

Considering the Manual's importance for Iraq, perhaps it is only
fitting that American strategists are now trying to win a war based on
lies with the stolen words and thoughts of others.

Comparisons of Unacknowledged Sources for Passages in The
Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Here are specific examples of portions of the Counterinsurgency Field
Manual, derived from other unacknowledged sources. The hyphenated
numbers preceding passages indicate the citation used in the
Counterinsurgency Manual. Bold writing indicates the portion of the
passage that has been used without attribution from another source;
indented passages present the original unacknowledged source passage
(references for source passages appear in parenthesis).

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-20: Society

"...sociologists define society as a population living in the same
geographic area that shares a culture and a common identity and whose
members are subject to the same political authority."

Unacknowledged Source:

"Formally, sociologists define society as a population living in
the same geographic area that shares a culture and a common identity
and whose members are subject to the same political
authority." (Newman, David. Sociology. 6th ed. Pine Forge Press, 2006.
P. 19.)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-24: Groups

"A group is two or more people regularly interacting on the basis
of shared expectations of others' behavior and who have interrelated
status and roles."

Unacknowledged Source:

"Group: two or more people regularly interacting on the basis of
shared expectations of others' behavior; interrelated statuses and
roles." (Silbey, Susan. Sociology study notes. 2002.
http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Anthropology/)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-25: Race

"A race is a human group that defines itself or is defined by
other groups as different by virtue of innate physical
characteristics. Biologically, there is no such thing as race among
human beings; race is a social category."

Unacknowledged Source:

[Race] "refers to a human group that defines itself or is defined
by others as different by virtue of innate and immutable physical
characteristics." (Encyclopedia Britannica. "Race." 1974, vol. 15.)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-26: Ethnic groups

"Members of ethnic groups see themselves as different from other
groups in a society and are recognized as such by others."

Unacknowledged Source:

Members of ethnic groups see themselves as culturally distinct
from other groups in a society, and are seen by those other groups to
be so in return." (Giddens, Anthony. Sociology, 2006, 5th ed, P. 487.)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-27: Tribes

"Tribes are generally defined as autonomous, genealogically
structured groups in which the rights of individuals are largely
determined by their ancestry and membership in a particular lineage."

Unacknowledged Source:

"[A Tribe is an] autonomous, genealogically structured group in
which the rights of individuals are largely determined by their
membership in corporate descent groups such as lineages." (Brown,
Kenneth. "A Few Reflections on the 'Tribe' and 'State' in Twentieth-
Century Morocco." In F. Abdul-Jabar & H. Dawod, eds., Tribes and
Power. Saqi Books, 2001. P. 206.)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-37: Culture

"Culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs,
behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society use to cope with
their world and with one another."

Unacknowledged Source:

"The system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and
artifacts that the members of society use to cope with this world and
with one another." (Plog, Fred and Daniel Bates. Cultural
Anthropology. Random House, 1988. 2nd ed. P. 7.)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-44: Values

"A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or
end state of existence is preferable to an opposite or converse mode
of conduct or end state of existence."

Unacknowledged Source:

"A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or
end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an
opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of
existence." (Rokeach, Milton. The Nature of Human Values. Free Press,
1973. P. 5.)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-51: Cultural Forms

"A ritual is a stereotyped sequence of activities involving
gestures, words, and objects performed to influence supernatural
entities or forces on behalf of the actors' goals and interest."

Unacknowledged Source:

Religious ritual is "a stereotyped sequence of activities
involving gestures, words, and objects, performed in a sequestered
place, and designed to influence preternatural entities or forces on
behalf of the actors' goals and interests." (Turner, Victor. W.
"Symbols in African Ritual". In J. Dolgin, et al., eds., Symbolic
Anthropology. Columbia Univ. Press, 1977. P. 2.)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-51: Cultural Forms

"Symbols can be objects, activities, words, relationships, events,
or gestures."

Unacknowledged Source:

"The symbols I observed in the field were, empirically, objects,
activities, relationships, events, gestures, and spatial units in a
ritual situation" (Turner, Victor. The Forest of Symbols. Cornell
University Press, 1967. P.19.)

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-55: Power and Authority

"Power is the probability that one actor within a social
relationship will be in a position to carry out his or her own will
despite resistance."

Unacknowledged Source:

"Power [Macht] is the probability that one actor within a social
relationship will be in a position to carry out his or her own will
despite resistance." (Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Univ. Calif.
Press, 1978 [orig. 1922]. P. 53.)

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