Re: OT - Nihilist Nation
- From: "Mithra" <mithra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2006 19:25:17 -0700
<hiroshima_facts@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:1156204321.468805.323360@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
mozart wrote:
by John S. Hatch
[snip]
Sixty-one years plus a few days after the criminal and cowardly bombing
of Hiroshima, and Nagasaki three days later, we hear the same tired and
insupportable arguments trotted out to try to defend the
indefensible--'we did it to save lives.
Cowardly?
As opposed to taking Japan island by island.
A short cut.
Many would call that cowardly.
Many would call it efficient.
Sort of like getting to a new land
populated with natives who use
bows and arrows to fight you, while
your people have guns and cannons
that can basically wipe them out
in short order, oops that's exactly
how the white man took over
this land!
Depends on what your bias is.
You think US would use nukes today? Have
they ever used any nukes since WWII?
Perhaps you've heard of Pearl Harbor?
They hit us so we hit them, HARDER.
We took the lives of babies and
women and grandparents and the ill in hospitals, we vaporized
schoolchildren, we created a firestorm worse than the one in
Dresden--to save lives. Both Japanese and American lives'. Sure, why
else? Besides, Truman described the city of 300,000 as a 'military
base'.
Hiroshima was a large military center. Its military districts held
tens of thousands of soldiers. And it held the military headquarters
in charge of the defense of the southern half of Japan.
Large military center? LOL
The Target Committee wanted the first bomb to be "sufficiently spectacular
for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when
publicity on it was released."3
3. Kurzman, Day of the Bomb 394.
The Target Committee at Los Alamos on May 10-11, 1945, recommended Kyoto,
Hiroshima, Yokohama, and the arsenal at Kokura as possible targets. The
committee rejected the use of the weapon against a strictly military
objective because of the chance of missing a small target not surrounded by
a larger urban area. The psychological effects on Japan were of great
importance to the committee members. They also agreed that the initial use
of the weapon should be sufficiently spectacular for its importance to be
internationally recognized. The committee felt Kyoto, as an intellectual
center of Japan, had a population "better able to appreciate the
significance of the weapon." Hiroshima was chosen because of its large size,
its being "an important army depot" and the potential that the bomb would
cause greater destruction because the city was surrounded by hills which
would have a "focusing effect".[7]
^ Atomic Bomb: Decision - Target Committee, May 10-11, 1945. Retrieved on
August 6, 2005.
Moreover, the notion that Hiroshima was a major military or industrial
center is implausible on the face of it. The city had remained untouched
through years of devastating air attacks on the Japanese home islands, and
never figured in Bomber Command's list of the 33 primary targets.92
http://www.lewrockwell.com/raico/raico22.html
U.S. President Harry Truman wrote in his diary before the attack on
Hiroshima that he wanted to use the bomb on a military target, not on women
or children. After the attack, he told the American people that his
administration had chosen Hiroshima because he said it was a military base.
"That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid insofar as
possible," he said, "the killing of civilians.
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/04/i_ins.01.html
Was Truman high?
You obviously bit hard.
tomorrow. But it is simply not true that an invasion of Japan would
ever have been necessary.
Whether it was necessary or not is something that can never be proven.
The military advised against the bombing,
No they didn't.
Here's a list of people who felt the bombing was
unnecessary:
~~~DWIGHT EISENHOWER
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in
Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic
bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of
cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon
giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the
plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous
assent.
"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a
feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on
the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the
bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our
country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose
employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American
lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some
way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply
perturbed by my attitude..."
- Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380
In a Newsweek interview, Eisenhower again recalled the meeting with Stimson:
"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them
with that awful thing."
- Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63
~~~ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY
(Chief of Staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman)
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The
Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the
effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.
"The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening.
My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an
ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught
to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and
children."
- William Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441.
~~~HERBERT HOOVER
On May 28, 1945, Hoover visited President Truman and suggested a way to end
the Pacific war quickly: "I am convinced that if you, as President, will
make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have
their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional
surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll
have both wars over."
Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg.
347.
On August 8, 1945, after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Hoover wrote to
Army and Navy Journal publisher Colonel John Callan O'Laughlin, "The use of
the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children,
revolts my soul."
quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 635.
"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February
1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such
leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the
[atomic] bombs."
- quoted by Barton Bernstein in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the
Smithsonian, pg. 142
Hoover biographer Richard Norton Smith has written: "Use of the bomb had
besmirched America's reputation, he [Hoover] told friends. It ought to have
been described in graphic terms before being flung out into the sky over
Japan."
Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg.
349-350.
In early May of 1946 Hoover met with General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover
recorded in his diary, "I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to
Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives
would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would
have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia
into Manchuria."
Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 350-351.
~~~GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
MacArthur biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction
to the issuance by the Allies of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan: "...the
Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally
or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that
the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an
orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people
would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically,
when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a
continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed,
the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been
unnecessary."
William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512.
Norman Cousins was a consultant to General MacArthur during the American
occupation of Japan. Cousins writes of his conversations with MacArthur,
"MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed."
He continues, "When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the
bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I
asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military
justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks
earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway,
to the retention of the institution of the emperor."
Norman Cousins, The Pathology of Power, pg. 65, 70-71.
~~~JOSEPH GREW
(Under Sec. of State)
In a February 12, 1947 letter to Henry Stimson (Sec. of War during WWII),
Grew responded to the defense of the atomic bombings Stimson had made in a
February 1947 Harpers magazine article:
"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such
a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued
in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government
might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the
necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision.
"If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or
July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the
use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer."
Grew quoted in Barton Bernstein, ed.,The Atomic Bomb, pg. 29-32.
~~~JOHN McCLOY
(Assistant Sec. of War)
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government
issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the
emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the
reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government,
it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was
delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it
favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion
after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely
associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the
ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of
effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the
necessity of dropping the bombs."
McCloy quoted in James Reston, Deadline, pg. 500.
~~~RALPH BARD
(Under Sec. of the Navy)
On June 28, 1945, a memorandum written by Bard the previous day was given to
Sec. of War Henry Stimson. It stated, in part:
"Following the three-power [July 1945 Potsdam] conference emissaries from
this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China
Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position [they were
about to declare war on Japan] and at the same time give them some
information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with
whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the
[retention of the] Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation
following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this
presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.
"I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a
program." He concluded the memorandum by noting, "The only way to find out
is to try it out."
Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb, Manhattan Engineer District Records,
Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 77, National Archives (also contained in:
Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 1987 edition, pg. 307-308).
Later Bard related, "...it definitely seemed to me that the Japanese were
becoming weaker and weaker. They were surrounded by the Navy. They couldn't
get any imports and they couldn't export anything. Naturally, as time went
on and the war developed in our favor it was quite logical to hope and
expect that with the proper kind of a warning the Japanese would then be in
a position to make peace, which would have made it unnecessary for us to
drop the bomb and have had to bring Russia in...".
quoted in Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg.
144-145, 324.
Bard also asserted, "I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and
they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that
suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving
proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted." He
continued, "In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever
used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn't have been necessary for us to disclose
our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing
much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb."
War Was Really Won Before We Used A-Bomb, U.S. News and World Report,
8/15/60, pg. 73-75.
~~~LEWIS STRAUSS
(Special Assistant to the Sec. of the Navy)
Strauss recalled a recommendation he gave to Sec. of the Navy James
Forrestal before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima:
"I proposed to Secretary Forrestal that the weapon should be demonstrated
before it was used. Primarily it was because it was clear to a number of
people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese
were nearly ready to capitulate... My proposal to the Secretary was that the
weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to Japanese
observers and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting
that a satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest
of cryptomeria trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomeria tree is the
Japanese version of our redwood... I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a
suitable height above such a forest... would lay the trees out in windrows
from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they were
matchsticks, and, of course, set them afire in the center. It seemed to me
that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could
destroy any of their cities at will... Secretary Forrestal agreed
wholeheartedly with the recommendation..."
Strauss added, "It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to
bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its
way into the armaments of the world...".
quoted in Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg.
145, 325.
~~~PAUL NITZE
(Vice Chairman, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey)
In 1950 Nitze would recommend a massive military buildup, and in the 1980s
he was an arms control negotiator in the Reagan administration. In July of
1945 he was assigned the task of writing a strategy for the air attack on
Japan. Nitze later wrote:
"The plan I devised was essentially this: Japan was already isolated from
the standpoint of ocean shipping. The only remaining means of transportation
were the rail network and intercoastal shipping, though our submarines and
mines were rapidly eliminating the latter as well. A concentrated air attack
on the essential lines of transportation, including railroads and (through
the use of the earliest accurately targetable glide bombs, then emerging
from development) the Kammon tunnels which connected Honshu with Kyushu,
would isolate the Japanese home islands from one another and fragment the
enemy's base of operations. I believed that interdiction of the lines of
transportation would be sufficiently effective so that additional bombing of
urban industrial areas would not be necessary.
"While I was working on the new plan of air attack... [I] concluded that
even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of
months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945."
Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg. 36-37 (my emphasis)
The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey group, assigned by President Truman to
study the air attacks on Japan, produced a report in July of 1946 that was
primarily written by Nitze and reflected his reasoning:
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the
testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's
opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability
prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic
bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even
if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."
quoted in Barton Bernstein, The Atomic Bomb, pg. 52-56.
In his memoir, written in 1989, Nitze repeated,
"Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly
unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese
government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands [scheduled for November 1,
1945] would have been necessary."
Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg. 44-45.
~~~ALBERT EINSTEIN
Einstein was not directly involved in the Manhattan Project (which developed
the atomic bomb). In 1905, as part of his Special Theory of Relativity, he
made the intriguing point that a relatively large amount of energy was
contained in and could be released from a relatively small amount of matter.
This became best known by the equation E=mc2. The atomic bomb was not based
upon this theory but clearly illustrated it.
In 1939 Einstein signed a letter to President Roosevelt that was drafted by
the scientist Leo Szilard. Received by FDR in October of that year, the
letter from Einstein called for and sparked the beginning of U.S. government
support for a program to build an atomic bomb, lest the Nazis build one
first.
Einstein did not speak publicly on the atomic bombing of Japan until a year
afterward. A short article on the front page of the New York Times contained
his view:
"Prof. Albert Einstein... said that he was sure that President Roosevelt
would have forbidden the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had he been alive and
that it was probably carried out to end the Pacific war before Russia could
participate."
Einstein Deplores Use of Atom Bomb, New York Times, 8/19/46, pg. 1.
Regarding the 1939 letter to Roosevelt, his biographer, Ronald Clark, has
noted:
"As far as his own life was concerned, one thing seemed quite clear. 'I made
one great mistake in my life,' he said to Linus Pauling, who spent an hour
with him on the morning of November 11, 1954, '...when I signed the letter
to President Roosevelt recommending that atom bombs be made; but there was
some justification - the danger that the Germans would make them.'".
Ronald Clark, Einstein: The Life and Times, pg. 620.
~~~LEO SZILARD
(The first scientist to conceive of how an atomic bomb might be made - 1933)
For many scientists, one motivation for developing the atomic bomb was to
make sure Germany, well known for its scientific capabilities, did not get
it first. This was true for Szilard, a Manhattan Project scientist.
"In the spring of '45 it was clear that the war against Germany would soon
end, and so I began to ask myself, 'What is the purpose of continuing the
development of the bomb, and how would the bomb be used if the war with
Japan has not ended by the time we have the first bombs?".
Szilard quoted in Spencer Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, ed., Leo Szilard:
His Version of the Facts, pg. 181.
After Germany surrendered, Szilard attempted to meet with President Truman.
Instead, he was given an appointment with Truman's Sec. of State to be,
James Byrnes. In that meeting of May 28, 1945, Szilard told Byrnes that the
atomic bomb should not be used on Japan. Szilard recommended, instead,
coming to an international agreement on the control of atomic weapons before
shocking other nations by their use:
"I thought that it would be a mistake to disclose the existence of the bomb
to the world before the government had made up its mind about how to handle
the situation after the war. Using the bomb certainly would disclose that
the bomb existed." According to Szilard, Byrnes was not interested in
international control: "Byrnes... was concerned about Russia's postwar
behavior. Russian troops had moved into Hungary and Rumania, and Byrnes
thought it would be very difficult to persuade Russia to withdraw her troops
from these countries, that Russia might be more manageable if impressed by
American military might, and that a demonstration of the bomb might impress
Russia." Szilard could see that he wasn't getting though to Byrnes; "I was
concerned at this point that by demonstrating the bomb and using it in the
war against Japan, we might start an atomic arms race between America and
Russia which might end with the destruction of both countries.".
Szilard quoted in Spencer Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, ed., Leo Szilard:
His Version of the Facts, pg. 184.
Two days later, Szilard met with J. Robert Oppenheimer, the head scientist
in the Manhattan Project. "I told Oppenheimer that I thought it would be a
very serious mistake to use the bomb against the cities of Japan.
Oppenheimer didn't share my view." "'Well, said Oppenheimer, 'don't you
think that if we tell the Russians what we intend to do and then use the
bomb in Japan, the Russians will understand it?'. 'They'll understand it
only too well,' Szilard replied, no doubt with Byrnes's intentions in mind."
Szilard quoted in Spencer Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, ed., Leo Szilard:
His Version of the Facts, pg. 185; also William Lanouette, Genius In the
Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, pg. 266-267.
~~~THE FRANCK REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS
The race for the atomic bomb ended with the May 1945 surrender of Germany,
the only other power capable of creating an atomic bomb in the near future.
This led some Manhattan Project scientists in Chicago to become among the
first to consider the long-term consequences of using the atomic bomb
against Japan in World War II. Their report came to be known as the Franck
Report, and included major contributions from Leo Szilard (referred to
above). Although an attempt was made to give the report to Sec. of War Henry
Stimson, it is unclear as to whether he ever received it.
International control of nuclear weapons for the prevention of a larger
nuclear war was the report's primary concern:
"If we consider international agreement on total prevention of nuclear
warfare as the paramount objective, and believe that it can be achieved,
this kind of introduction of atomic weapons [on Japan] to the world may
easily destroy all our chances of success. Russia... will be deeply shocked.
It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was
capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon, as
indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is
to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by
international agreement.".
The Franck Committee, which could not know that the Japanese government
would approach Russia in July to try to end the war, compared the short-term
possible saving of lives by using the bomb on Japan with the long-term
possible massive loss of lives in a nuclear war:
"...looking forward to an international agreement on prevention of nuclear
warfare - the military advantages and the saving of American lives, achieved
by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan, may be outweighed by the
ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and repulsion, sweeping over
the rest of the world...".
The report questioned the ability of destroying Japanese cities with atomic
bombs to bring surrender when destroying Japanese cities with conventional
bombs had not done so. It recommended a demonstration of the atomic bomb for
Japan in an unpopulated area. Facing the long-term consequences with Russia,
the report stated prophetically:
"If no international agreement is concluded immediately after the first
demonstration, this will mean a flying start of an unlimited armaments
race.".
The report pointed out that the United States, with its highly concentrated
urban areas, would become a prime target for nuclear weapons and concluded:
"We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear bombs for an
early, unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable. If the United States
would be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction
upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world,
precipitate the race of armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching
an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.".
Political and Social Problems, Manhattan Engineer District Records,
Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 76, National Archives (also contained in:
Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 1987 edition, pg. 323-333).
~~~ELLIS ZACHARIAS
(Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence)
Based on a series of intelligence reports received in late 1944, Zacharias,
long a student of Japan's people and culture, believed the Japan would soon
be ripe for surrender if the proper approach were taken. For him, that
approach was not as simple as bludgeoning Japanese cities:
"...while Allied leaders were immediately inclined to support all
innovations however bold and novel in the strictly military sphere, they
frowned upon similar innovations in the sphere of diplomatic and
psychological warfare."
Ellis Zacharias, The A-Bomb Was Not Needed, United Nations World, Aug. 1949,
pg. 29.
Zacharias saw that there were diplomatic and religious (the status of the
Emperor) elements that blocked the doves in Japan's government from making
their move:
"What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into
the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the
meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after
defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor
could remain on the throne after surrender."
Ellis Zacharias, Eighteen Words That Bagged Japan, Saturday Evening Post,
11/17/45, pg. 17.
To resolve these issues, Zacharias developed several plans for secret
negotiations with Japanese representatives; all were rejected by the U.S.
government. Instead, a series of psychological warfare radio broadcasts by
Zacharias was later approved. In the July 21, 1945 broadcast, Zacharias made
an offer to Japan that stirred controversy in the U.S.: a surrender based on
the Atlantic Charter. On July 25th, the U.S. intercepted a secret
transmission from Japan's Foreign Minister (Togo) to their Ambassador to
Moscow (Sato), who was trying to set up a meeting with the Soviets to
negotiate an end to the war. The message referred to the Zacharias broadcast
and stated:
"...special attention should be paid to the fact that at this time the
United States referred to the Atlantic Charter. As for Japan, it is
impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we
should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels
that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter."
U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Conference of
Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, vol. 2, pg. 1260-1261.
But on July 26th, the U.S., Great Britain, and China publicly issued the
Potsdam Proclamation demanding "unconditional surrender" from Japan.
Zacharias later commented on the favorable Japanese response to his
broadcast:
"But though we gained a victory, it was soon to be canceled out by the
Potsdam Declaration and the way it was handled.
"Instead of being a diplomatic instrument, transmitted through regular
diplomatic channels and giving the Japanese a chance to answer, it was put
on the radio as a propaganda instrument pure and simple. The whole maneuver,
in fact, completely disregarded all essential psychological factors dealing
with Japan."
Zacharias continued, "The Potsdam Declaration, in short, wrecked everything
we had been working for to prevent further bloodshed...
"Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and
introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in
effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.
"Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time
to use the A-bomb.
"I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds.
And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds."
Ellis Zacharias, How We Bungled the Japanese Surrender, Look, 6/6/50, pg.
19-21.
~~~GENERAL CARL "TOOEY" SPAATZ
(In charge of Air Force operations in the Pacific)
General Spaatz was the person who received the order for the Air Force to
"deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual
bombing after about 3 August 1945..."(Leslie Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pg.
308). In a 1964 interview, Spaatz explained:
"The dropping of the atomic bomb was done by a military man under military
orders. We're supposed to carry out orders and not question them."
In the same interview, Spaatz referred to the Japanese military's plan to
get better peace terms, and he gave an alternative to the atomic bombings:
"If we were to go ahead with the plans for a conventional invasion with
ground and naval forces, I believe the Japanese thought that they could
inflict very heavy casualties on us and possibly as a result get better
surrender terms. On the other hand if they knew or were told that no
invasion would take place [and] that bombing would continue until the
surrender, why I think the surrender would have taken place just about the
same time." (Herbert Feis Papers, Box 103, N.B.C. Interviews, Carl Spaatz
interview by Len Giovannitti, Library of Congress).
~~~BRIGADIER GENERAL CARTER CLARKE
(The military intelligence officer in charge of preparing intercepted
Japanese cables - the MAGIC summaries - for Truman and his advisors)
"...when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and
they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an
experiment for two atomic bombs."
Quoted in Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 359.
The truth is that although there were holdouts in the military, the
Japanese had been looking for ways to surrender, with one
condition--the retention of the Imperial system.
The truth is, those military holdouts had the power to prevent Japan
from surrendering with only that condition, and they in fact prevented
such a surrender offer until after Nagasaki was bombed.
Japan was done as a military threat. The US knew they were
dealing with a hawk element and dove element. US chose
not to deal with the dove element because US wanted to
drop the bombs avoiding mainland invasion and justifying
the billions of dollars spent on the Manhattan Project. From a political
standpoint, the administration could not afford to agree
to surrender terms, they forced an unconditional surrender
knowing full well what the consequences would be.
That is, they asked
that the Emperor neither be deposed nor tried for war crimes. America
refused, because she wanted to use the bombs as a field experiment, to
warn the Russians of America's might (and pitilessness) and to study
the effects of intense radiation on a large population, something which
of course was not yet well understood.
No, we refused because we had no intention of letting them surrender
with such a guarantee.
And more importantly, Japan did not ask to surrender with that one
condition until the day after Nagasaki.
The US stated "unconditional surrender" in the postsdam knowing
full well the Emperor, doves and hawks would not agree to such terms.
If Hiroshima was brutal,
Nagasaki was a case of savage overkill that must have made Dr. Mengele
giggle maniacally.
When Nagasaki was bombed, Japan hadn't offered to surrender yet.
They hadn't surrendered because on 8/6 after Hiroshimo, Japan
was waiting for a Soviet response for help. Early morning
8/9 they got their answer when the Soviets invaded Manchuria and delcared
war on Japan. Later that morning Nagasaki was hit.
And after the ghastly experiments were over, Japan
was allowed its one token condition after all.
Incorrect. There was no guarantee for the Emperor in the surrender
terms.
Had the US simply acknowledged Japan's silly saving
face nonsense to begin with and not forced unconditional
surrender, the bombings likely would not have been
necessary.
Are you so blind that the US didn't spin propaganda
back then as they do now in order to justify things?
You know like Weapons of Mass Destruction?
It seems most of what you've posted indicates you're
a victim of the US propoganda machine. Don't fret,
there are millions like you.
The US has made good decisions and bad ones.
Trying to hide behind obvious propaganda
reveals quite a bit about you.
.
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