OT - Great Neo-Con Piece (long)
- From: "mozark" <swooning@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 20 Apr 2006 09:27:15 -0700
Vice Squad
They terrorize other government officials, and they're so secretive
that their names aren't even revealed to a harmless federal employee
directory. And they've helped ruin the country. Meet Dick Cheney's
staff.
By Robert Dreyfuss
American Spectator
Bad heart, errant shotgun, and Halliburton stock options in tow, Dick
Cheney has ruled the White House roost for the past five years,
amassing enough power to give rise to the joke that George W. Bush is
"a heartbeat away from the presidency."
Yet, despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of words have been
written on Cheney's role in the Bush administration, most of what's
been written fails to explain how the vice president wields his
extraordinary authority. Notoriously opaque, the Office of the Vice
President (OVP) is very difficult for journalists to penetrate. But a
Prospect investigation shows that the key to Cheney's influence lies
with the corps of hard-line acolytes he assembled in 2001. They serve
not only as his eyes and ears, monitoring a federal bureaucracy that
resists many of Cheney's pet initiatives, but sometimes serve as his
fists, too, when the man from Wyoming feels that the passive-aggressive
bureaucrats need bullying. Like disciplined Bolsheviks slicing through
a fractious opposition, Cheney's team operates with a single-minded,
ideological focus on the exercise of American military power, a belief
in the untrammeled power of the presidency, and a fierce penchant for
secrecy.
Since 2001, reporters and columnists have tended to refer to Cheney's
office obliquely, if at all. Rather than explicitly discuss the
neoconservative cabal that has assumed control of important parts of
U.S. policy since September 11, they couple references to "the
civilians at the Pentagon" with "officials in the vice
president's office" when referring to administration hard-liners.
But rarely do the mainstream media provide much detail to explain who
those people are, what they've done, and how they operate.
At the high-water mark of neoconservative power, when coalition forces
invaded Iraq in March 2003, the vice president's office was the
command center for a web of like-minded officials in the White House,
the Pentagon, the State Department, and other agencies, often described
by former officials as "Dick Cheney's spies." Now, thanks to a
misguided war and a bungled occupation, along with a string of
foreign-policy failures that have alienated U.S. allies and triggered a
wave of anti-American feeling around the globe, the numbers and
influence of those Cheneyites outside the office have receded. No
longer quite so commanding, the office seems more like a bunker for
neoconservatives and their fellow travelers in the administration. Yet
if only because of Dick Cheney's Rasputin-like hold over the
president, his office remains a formidable power indeed.
Still, for the first time, nervous Republicans are raising serious
questions about Cheney. With his public approval plummeting to
previously unknown depths for a major U.S. politician -- by late
February he had fallen to just 18 percent -- he has lost all but the
most reflexive of knee-jerk conservatives. With the vice president
increasingly seen as a liability, there is a quiet murmur among GOP
insiders about dumping him. The Moonie-linked Insight magazine, wired
into right-wing Republicans, last month reported that moves are afoot
to "retire" Cheney in 2007. Writing in The Wall Street Journal,
former Bush Senior speechwriter Peggy Noonan gave full voice to the
dump-Cheney idea. "I suspect what they're thinking and not saying
is, 'If Dick Cheney weren't vice president, who'd be a good vice
president?'" she wrote. "And one night over drinks at a barbecue
in McLean one top guy will turn to another top guy and say, ...
'wouldn't you like to replace Cheney?'"
More often than not, from policy toward China and North Korea to the
invasion of Iraq to pressure for regime change in Iran and Syria, and
on issues from detentions to torture to spying by the National Security
Agency, the muscle of the vice president's office has prevailed.
Usually, that muscle is exercised covertly. Last February, for example,
after Hamas won the Palestinian elections, King Abdullah of Jordan
visited Washington to discuss the implications of the vote. With the
support of some officials in the State Department, the young king
suggested that Washington should bolster beleaguered President Mahmoud
Abbas, the Fatah leader, to counter the new power of Hamas.
Then John Hannah intervened. A former official at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a pro-Zionist think tank
founded by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, Hannah is a
neoconservative ideologue who, after the resignation of Irving Lewis
"Scooter" Libby, moved up to become Vice President Dick Cheney's
top adviser on national security.
Hannah moved instantly to undermine Abdullah's influence. Not only
should the United States not deal with Hamas, but Abbas, Fatah, and the
entire Palestinian Authority were no longer relevant, he argued,
according to intelligence insiders. Speaking for the vice president's
office, Hannah instead sought to align U.S. policy with the go-it-alone
strategy of Israel's hard-liners, including Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert and his stricken patron and predecessor, Ariel Sharon. Olmert
soon stunned observers by declaring that Israel would unilaterally set
final borders in the West Bank, annexing large swaths of occupied land,
by the year 2010. His declaration precisely mirrored Hannah's
argument that Israel should act alone.
Whether that viewpoint will prevail in the United States is unclear,
but early indications are that the Bush administration is swinging in
that direction. Hannah's intervention is typical of how the OVP staff
has engaged at all levels of the U.S. policy-making process to overcome
opposition from professionals in the State Department, the intelligence
community, and even the National Security Council (NSC) itself.
Richard Perle, who formerly served on the Defense Policy Board, insists
that the power of those who share his worldview is exaggerated. "The
myth of the power of the neoconservatives in the administration is
exactly that," says Perle. "The president holds the views that he
holds. And the people you're talking about are much closer to the
president's view than the people they are arguing against." But
officials who have opposed Cheney believe that President Bush has
"views" only about basic principles, and that in making dozens of
complex decisions he relies on pre-determined staff papers. Says one
insider deeply involved in U.S. policy toward North Korea: "The
president is given only the most basic notions about the Korea issue.
They tell him, 'Above South Korea is a country called North Korea. It
is an evil regime.' ... So that translates into a presidential
decision: Why enter into any agreement with an evil regime?"
Last fall, when U.S. envoy Christopher Hill was planning to visit North
Korea to try to resolve the impasse over that country's nuclear
weapons, Cheney's staff intervened to kill Hill's mission,
according to sources involved in planning his trip. That the Office of
the Vice President can kill a major initiative by the State Department
and the NSC, on an issue of the highest priority, is stark testament to
the sustained power of the vice president's office. And despite
Cheney's unpopularity -- and the parallel decline of neoconservative
influence -- it remains a potent force.
Devoid of well-known names and faces, the OVP was nearly invisible to
the public until last fall. That's when "Scooter" Libby was
indicted for lying to federal investigators in the Valerie Plame case,
focusing the media spotlight on the vice president's chief of staff
and top national security adviser, who resigned immediately. Aside from
Libby, however, virtually none of Cheney's current aides has endured
any scrutiny. Outside the Washington cognoscenti, it's a safe bet
that not one in a hundred Americans could name a single Cheney aide.
Since 2001, the list has included David Addington, who replaced Libby;
top national security advisers such as Eric Edelman and Victoria
Nuland; radical-right Middle East specialists such as Hannah, William
J. Luti, and David Wurmser; anti-China, geopolitical Asia hands like
Stephen Yates and Samantha Ravich; an assortment of conservative
apparatchiks and technocrats, often neoconservative-connected,
including C. Dean McGrath, Aaron Friedberg, Karen Knutson, and Carol
Kuntz; lobbyists and domestic policy gurus, such as Nancy Dorn,
Jonathan Burks, Nina Shokraiil Rees, Cesar Conda, and Candida Wolf --
and a host of communications directors, flacks, and spokespeople over
the years, notably "Cheney's angels": Mary Matalin, Juleanna
Glover Weiss, Jennifer Millerwise, Catherine Martin, and Lee Anne
McBride.
It is the latter, especially Cheney's press secretaries -- he has run
through seven of them -- whose job is saying nothing, and saying it
often. His press people seem shocked that a reporter would even ask for
an interview with the staff. The blanket answer is no -- nobody is
available. Amazingly, the vice president's office flatly refuses to
even disclose who works there, or what their titles are. "We just
don't give out that kind of information," says Jennifer Mayfield,
another of Cheney's "angels." She won't say who is on staff, or
what they do? No, she insists. "It's just not something we talk
about." The notoriously silent OVP staff rebuffs not just pesky
reporters but even innocuous database researchers from companies like
Carroll Publishing, which puts out the quarterly Federal Directory.
"They're tight-lipped about the kind of information they put
out," says Albert Ruffin, senior editor at Carroll, who fumes that
Cheney's office doesn't bother returning his calls when he's
updating the limited information he manages to collect.
The OVP's enduring obsession with absolute secrecy first became
obvious during the long court battle early in Bush's first term over
the energy task force chaired by Cheney. Neither the coalition of
watchdog and environmental groups that sued the ovp nor members of
Congress and the Government Accountability Office discovered much about
the workings of the task force. Addington, then Cheney's general
counsel, enforced the say-nothing policy ultimately upheld by federal
courts. "He engineered an extraordinary expansion of government power
at the expense of accountability," says Tom Fitton, president of
Judicial Watch, the conservative gadfly group that sued Cheney. "We
got a terse letter back from Addington saying essentially, 'Go jump
in the lake.'"
Addington, 49, has spent almost exactly half of his life working for or
working alongside Dick Cheney, from an impressionable youngster in his
early 20s to the hard-nosed ideologue that he is today. They first met
in the early 1980s, when Addington served as a counsel for the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Iran-Contra Committee, and then the House
Intelligence Committee, when Cheney was a member of the committee. When
Cheney became secretary of defense, Addington was his special assistant
and then the Defense Department's general counsel. When Cheney toyed
with running for president in the 1990s, Addington ran his political
action committee. In the ovp, Addington has emerged as the single most
militant advocate for the unfettered power of the presidency. "Early
on, with the detainee issues, the torture issues, even before Abu
Ghraib, people [would say] that David Addington is the source of all
this stuff," says a senior national security lawyer in Washington.
"This stuff" includes the spectrum of controversial
counterterrorism powers, from military tribunals for captured terror
suspects, to justifying torture of prisoners, to detention of alleged
terrorists without access to courts or counsel, to the legal rationale
for ignoring the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in allowing the
National Security Agency to spy on Americans. "He believes that in
time of war, there is total authority for the president to waive any
rules to carry out his objectives," is how Congresswoman Jane Harman,
the intelligence committee's ranking Democrat, described Addington to
The Washington Post. "Those views have extremely dangerous
implications."
Addington is typical of the staffers brought on in 2001, when Cheney
began assembling what was dubbed, even then, a "shadow NSC." Unlike
previous administrations, including Bill Clinton's, Cheney's office
was loaded for partisan bear from day one. Leon Fuerth, who led Al
Gore's office of national security affairs for eight years, says that
their far smaller operation was led by nonpolitical or military
staffers who weren't vetted for political loyalties or ideology.
"The people who worked for me were all seconded from federal
agencies, every one of them. They were uniformed officers from all
three branches, people from the Department of Commerce, from the CIA,
but all of them were professionals and civil servants," says Fuerth.
"I was the only politically appointed person. My deputy was at first
an Air Force colonel, and after he retired, an Army colonel." He
recalls that one appointee, settling into an office in Fuerth's shop,
hung a portrait of Ronald Reagan.
There probably aren't any portraits of Bill Clinton or FDR on the
walls of Cheney's OVP, which sprawls throughout the executive office
building across the street from the White House. Instead, the staff --
hand-picked by Libby -- was drawn from the ranks of far-right think
tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute,
and WINEP, and from carefully screened Cheney loyalists in law firms
around town -- all of whom hit the ground running.
Larry Wilkerson, formerly a top aide to Secretary of State Colin
Powell, is a no-nonsense, ex-military man who has spoken out bluntly
about what he calls a "cabal" led by Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, and their top aides. Time after time, in various
interagency meetings, all the way up to the Cabinet-level "principals
committee," Wilkerson would watch in astonishment as Cheney's
staffers muscled everyone else.
"The staff that the vice president sent out made sure that those
[committees] didn't key anything up that wasn't what the vice
president wanted," says Wilkerson. "Their style was simply to sit
and listen, and take notes. And if things looked like they were going
to go speedily to a decision that they knew that the vice president
wasn't going to like, generally they would, at the end of the
meeting, in great bureaucratic style, they'd say: 'We totally
disagree. Meeting's over.'" At that point, policymakers from the
nsc, the State Department, the Defense Department, and elsewhere would
have to go back to the drawing board. And if a policy option that
Cheney opposed somehow got written up as a decision memorandum and sent
to the Oval Office, he showed up to kill it. "The vice president's
second or third bite at the apple was when he'd walk in to see the
president," says Wilkerson. "And things would get reversed, because
of the vice president's meeting in the Oval Office with no one else
there."
According to Fuerth, such a skewed modus operandi was unthinkable in
the Clinton-Gore administration. "There is no doubt that we exercised
a great deal of influence, but it was never in the form of a
peremptory, you-may-not-go-down-this-path, or
you-must-go-down-this-path," he says. "It was advisory."
Former Cheney aides tend to confirm Wilkerson's version of how the
OVP operates. Dean McGrath, who served as Cheney's deputy chief of
staff under Libby from 2001 until last year, says he didn't hesitate
to express the vice president's views during the policy-making
process. "I tried to convey at meetings where he would come down on
issues," says McGrath. An important mission of the OVP was to do
battle with a resistant bureaucracy. "Often you'd have the
permanent bureaucracy that was not on board, especially on all of the
issues where you're trying to change things," he says.
Aaron Friedberg, who served as Cheney's director of policy planning
for three years, agrees that the bureaucracy was often an obstacle.
"It's not an active resistance. It's a passive skepticism about
the whole direction of policy." Friedberg, who says that he worked on
issues of "terrorism, Asia, Europe, Russia, North Korea, Iran, just
about everything outside of Iraq," suggested that the biggest issue
on which Cheney had to confront the bureaucracy was over the
administration's push for democracy, especially in the Middle East.
That program's overseer is his daughter Liz Cheney, a top State
Department official.
Wilkerson portrays the vice president's office as the source of a
zealous, almost messianic approach to foreign affairs. "There were
several remarkable things about the vice president's staff," he
says. "One was how empowered they were, and one was how in sync they
were. In fact, we used to say about both [Rumsfeld's office] and the
vice president's office that they were going to win nine out of ten
battles, because they are ruthless, because they have a strategy, and
because they never, ever deviate from that strategy ... They make a
decision, and they make it in secret, and they make in a different way
than the rest of the bureaucracy makes it, and then suddenly foist it
on the government -- and the rest of the government is all confused."
Often the rest of the U.S. government -- including even the NSC --
would operate outside the normal interagency process to prevent the OVP
from interfering, according to officials who asked to remain anonymous.
Perhaps most startling is the sidetracking of the NSC, which is by
statute the ultimate arbiter for policy options and recommendations
that go to the president's desk.
According to Wilkerson, Cheney's office and the NSC were completely
separate on foreign policy. Cheney, says Wilkerson, "set up a staff
that knew what the statutory nsc was doing, but the NSC statutory staff
didn't know what his staff was doing. The vice president's staff
could read the statutory NSC's e-mail, but the NSC couldn't read
their e-mail. So, once someone on the statutory NSC figured it out,
they used various work-arounds. Like, for example, they would walk to
someone's office, rather than send an e-mail, if what they were going
to talk about they didn't want to reveal to the vice president's
very powerful staff." But that was difficult because of Cheney
"spies" within the bureaucracy, including people like John Bolton
at the State Department, Robert Joseph at the NSC, certain staffers at
WINPAC (the arms control shop at CIA), and various Pentagon officials,
he adds.
Two of the people most often encountered by Wilkerson were Cheney's
Asia hands, Stephen Yates and Samantha Ravich. Through them, the
fulcrum of Cheney's foreign policy -- which linked energy, China,
Iraq, Israel, and oil in the Middle East -- can be traced. The nexus of
those interrelated issues drives the OVP's broad outlook.
Many Cheney staffers were obsessed with what they saw as a looming,
long-term threat from China. Several of Cheney's highest-ranking
national security aides came out of Congresswoman Christopher Cox's
rather wild-eyed 1990s investigation of alleged Chinese spying in the
United States, tied to the overblown allegations about Chinese
contributions to the Clinton-Gore campaign. Cox, a California
Republican, chaired a highly partisan committee that issued a scathing
report about China. According to The New York Times, his 700-page
report portrayed China as "nothing less than a voracious, dangerous,
and fully-equipped military rival of the United States." Among the
top Cheney aides who joined the OVP in 2001 from Cox's staff were
Libby, who served as legal adviser to the committee; McGrath, a key
staffer for Cox; and Jonathan Burks, a senior Cox aide who became
Cheney's special assistant. Yates, who joined the team from The
Heritage Foundation, is a China specialist who has long urged a more
confrontational policy. In 2000, he wrote a Heritage paper offering
advice to the Bush administration, and slamming Clinton for
accommodating China. He urged a stronger, pro-Taiwan policy while
predicting a Chinese attack. Charles W. Freeman, who served as U.S.
ambassador to China and has known Yates for many years, puts him in the
same category as former Defense Department officials Paul Wolfowitz and
Douglas Feith, who "all saw China as the solution to 'enemy
deprivation syndrome.'"
Yates, who left Cheney's office recently to join the
ultraconservative lobbying and law firm of Barbour, Griffith, Rogers,
had an important impact on Asia and Middle East policy. Says Wilkerson:
"Generally Steve was quiet. But when there came a time for him to
speak, the room grew very silent, and that did it. We weren't going
any further in that discussion item if Steve said that the vice
president didn't like it. And it didn't take too long to understand
that the real power in the room was sitting there from the vice
president's office." Yates declined to comment for this story, but
in an interview with National Journal he pooh-poohed the idea that
Cheney's office had set itself up as a shadow NSC. "The idea that
10 or 15 people can replicate or supplant the work of the 100 to 200
people on the NSC ... is a bit unrealistic," he said.
For the Cheneyites, Middle East policy is tied to China, and in their
view China's appetite for oil makes it a strategic competitor to the
United States in the Persian Gulf region. Thus, they regard the control
of the Gulf as a zero-sum game. They believe that the invasion of
Afghanistan, the U.S. military buildup in Central Asia, the invasion of
Iraq, and the expansion of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf
states have combined to check China's role in the region. In
particular, the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the creation of a
pro-American regime in Baghdad was, for at least 10 years before 2003,
a top neoconservative goal, one that united both the anti-China crowd
and far-right supporters of Israel's Likud. Both saw the invasion of
Iraq as the prelude to an assault on neighboring Iran.
Several of Cheney's top aides, as well as the vice president himself,
were early supporters of the neoconservative flagship Project for a New
American Century, whose founding statement called for a return to a
"Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity." Among
them were Libby, Friedberg, and Robert Kagan, who is married to
Victoria Nuland, the U.S. ambassador to NATO who served as national
security adviser in the OVP. She, in turn, succeeded Eric Edelman,
another neoconservative who left the vice president's office to serve
as ambassador to Turkey before taking over Douglas Feith's job as
chief of policy for the Department of Defense.
The pivotal role of Cheney's staff in promoting war in Iraq has been
well documented. Cheney was the war's most vocal advocate, and his
staff -- especially Libby, Hannah, Ravich, and others -- worked hard to
"fit" intelligence to inflate Iraq's seeming threat. William J.
Luti, a neoconservative radical, left Cheney's office for the
Pentagon in 2001, where he organized the war planning team called the
Office of Special Plans. David Wurmser, another neoconservative from
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), joined the Pentagon to found
the forerunner of the OSP, the so-called Counterterrorism Evaluation
Group, which then manufactured the evidence that Saddam Hussein and
al-Qaeda were allies. To that end, Wurmser worked closely with Hannah,
Libby, Luti, and Harold Rhode, a Defense Department official in Andy
Marshall's Office of Net Assessment. Ravich, along with Zalmay
Khalilzad, a neoconservative Middle East analyst and now U.S.
ambassador to Iraq, worked hard to build the Iraqi National
Congress-linked opposition forces under Ahmad Chalabi. Libby and
Hannah produced key propaganda for the war, including the most
inflammatory and inaccurate speeches delivered by Cheney and Bush. The
Libby-Hannah team also authored a 48-page speech for Colin Powell's
2003 United Nations appearance so extreme that Powell trashed the
entire document. That version has never been released.
David L. Phillips, the author of Losing Iraq, was a State Department
consultant during the prelude to the war in 2003, and he watched Ravich
operate. His account provides a perfect paradigm for the OVP's role
in interagency meetings, in this case involving the most important
decision of the administration's tenure: the decision to go to war in
Iraq. During meeting after meeting in London, in Brussels, or in
Washington with Chalabi, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), and the
rest of the Iraqi opposition (including its Shiite fundamentalist
component), the youthful, inexperienced Ravich dominated the course of
events because of her association with Cheney. "The State Department
officials showed extraordinary deference to her," says Phillips.
"It was almost a sense that their efforts would be judged by Ms.
Ravich and reported to the OVP." The INC and Chalabi "would run to
Samantha when there were disagreements." In those meetings, the INC
"would hold forth on their ties to the OVP as a form of threat over
U.S. officials or other Iraqis. And U.S. officials felt that if there
was a misstep, the Iraqis would go running to the OVP and they would
have their chains yanked," says Phillips. In Washington, Hannah
served as the INC's chief political point of contact, according to
Entifadh Qanbar, an INC official who is serving as defense attaché at
the Iraqi embassy.
Like Hannah, who came to the OVP from the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, Wurmser traipsed a roundabout path to Cheney's staff: He
worked with Hannah at WINEP in the 1990s, and then went to AEI, where
he directed Middle East affairs, to the Pentagon's Office of Special
Plans, to John Bolton's arms control shop at the State Department,
and then to the OVP. Even among ardent supporters of Israel, Wurmser --
and his wife, Meyrav, who runs the Hudson Institute's Middle East
program -- is considered an extremist. In 1996, the Wurmsers, Perle,
and Feith co-authored the famous "Clean Break" paper for
then-Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, which called for radical measures
to redraw the map of the entire Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Jordan,
Palestine) to benefit Israel. Later, in a series of papers and a book,
Wurmser argued that toppling Saddam was likely to lead directly to
civil war and the breakup of Iraq, but he supported the policy anyway:
"The residual unity of [Iraq] is an illusion projected by the extreme
repression of the state." After Saddam, Iraq will "be ripped apart
by the politics of warlords, tribes, clans, sects, and key families,"
he wrote. "Underneath facades of unity enforced by state repression,
[Iraq's] politics is defined primarily by tribalism, sectarianism,
and gang/clan-like competition." Yet Wurmser explicitly urged the
United States and Israel to "expedite" such a collapse. "The
issue here is whether the West and Israel can construct a strategy for
limiting and expediting the chaotic collapse that will ensue in order
to move on to the task of creating a better circumstance." Later,
with former cia director James Woolsey and others, Wurmser proposed
restoring the Jordan-based Hashemite monarchy in Iraq. While
Wurmser's OVP allies may share his neoconservative fantasies of the
willy-nilly reorganization of the Middle East, few experts do.
"I've known him for years, and I consider him to be a naive
simpleton," says a former U.S. ambassador. Adds Wilkerson, "A lot
of these guys, including Wurmser, I looked at as card-carrying members
of the Likud party, as I did with Feith. You wouldn't open their
wallet and find a card, but I often wondered if their primary
allegiance was to their own country or to Israel. That was the thing
that troubled me, because there was so much that they said and did that
looked like it was more reflective of Israel's interest than our
own."
Today Wurmser, Hannah, Liz Cheney, and her father are pushing hard for
confrontations with both Iran and Syria. Liz Cheney, who exercises
enormous power inside the State Department, has secured millions of
dollars to support opposition elements in both countries, and she has
met with Syria's version of Ahmad Chalabi, a discredited businessman
from Virginia named Farid al-Ghadry. Hannah sat in on the meeting with
Ghadry, which was arranged through Meyrav Wurmser, a friend of the
would-be Syrian leader. Hannah and Wurmser's boss, the vice
president, talks freely about the need for a military showdown with
Iran to destroy its alleged nuclear program. The true measure of how
powerful the vice president's office remains today is whether the
United States chooses to confront Iran and Syria or to seek diplomatic
solutions. For the moment, at least, the war party led by Dick Cheney
remains in ascendancy.
.
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