OT NASA death glider. truly unbelievable
- From: gk1@xxxxxxxxx
- Date: 29 Jul 2005 12:26:03 -0700
they should rename the shuttle the "death glider."
heads must roll over this incompetent decision-making process.
i wonder what they tell the astronauts. "gee, we can't afford to fix
this little problem that might get you all killed. we can't even
afford research into fixing the problem. so instead, if it should
happen again, we'll just inspect to see if it happened, then you can
make a dangerous spacewalk to slap our sketchy repair kit and super
glue it on, and then cross your fingers and hope you don't fry like a
donut in emeril's kitchen. if you don't want to go, we fully
understand, there are plenty of other people who've dreamed about going
into space since being kids and don't mind a 1 in 10 chance of
death-glider cremation."
G
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-na-foam29jul29,0,2153441.story?coll=la-home-headlines
Behind Chunks of Foam, a Failure to Confront Hazard
NASA was never forced to attack shuttle debris peril, and apparently
rejected wider solutions.
By Ralph Vartabedian, Times Staff Writer
In a history that includes technical setbacks and failures, NASA has
always bounced back with a solution over the four decades of human
spaceflight.
But its finding that large pieces of foam fell off the shuttle
Discovery's external fuel tank during Tuesday's launch shows that the
space agency has failed to solve the cause of the Columbia accident
that killed seven astronauts on their return voyage in February 2003.
ADVERTISEMENT
In the months after the Columbia disaster, NASA learned that foam
debris falling off the external tank damaged the sensitive thermal
protection system on the orbiter. Columbia burned up over Texas when
superheated gases penetrated its wing. NASA then spent more than two
years and $1.4 billion trying to improve safety.
However, the recommendations made by Columbia's accident investigators
did not force NASA to confront the problem head-on. The board told the
space agency to "initiate" a program to eliminate foam debris and
"initiate" a program to strengthen the orbiter's thermal protection
system, but it did not make NASA adopt a 100% fix to either system.
It also appears that in 2003, NASA rejected efforts by outside experts
who proposed comprehensive fixes to the foam problem, because the
proposals required aggressive redesigns or advanced foam technology
that might have required significant investments.
The path NASA took instead was to fix, at limited cost, an old launch
system that it planned to get rid of by the end of the decade.
Retired Navy Adm. Harold W. Gehman Jr., chairman of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board, acknowledged Thursday that the
recommendations to NASA left open a window that would have allowed the
same scenario of foam debris falling off and damaging the orbiter's
thermal protection system.
"We had precious little faith that they could stop this stuff from
coming off," Gehman said in an interview. "And lo and behold, they
couldn't."
Nonetheless, Gehman defends the decision, saying any binding
requirement to fix the system "wasn't reasonable."
Gehman said neither his accident investigators nor NASA had any
definitive explanation for why foam even fell off the tank, let alone a
proposal for how to stop it.
"At the time, we got mixed and inconsistent explanations why foam fell
off," Gehman said. "When we went into the body of research, it was
inconsistent and unpersuasive."
John Logsdon, director of the Space Policy Institute at George
Washington University and another member of the Columbia board,
acknowledged that he thought the board should have issued a tougher
recommendation on fixing the foam.
"Could we have been tougher? Hindsight is wonderful," Logsdon said. "We
put together a set of recommendations that provided a context in which
the shuttle program could move forward. They had budget and schedule
constraints."
Even NASA officials acknowledged that they erred. "We decided it was
safe to fly as is. Obviously, we were wrong," Bill Parsons, manager of
the shuttle program, said Wednesday.
Instead of fixing the debris problem, the board focused many
recommendations on allowing astronauts to survive such a foam strike.
It required advanced photography of the launches to determine whether
debris damaged the orbiter, a capability to repair wings in space and a
rescue plan in case astronauts were marooned in orbit.
While such measures might save the lives of astronauts, they would not
save the space program from a debilitating loss of another shuttle or a
delay in launches, as it is now facing. NASA officials say they do not
know how long it will take to fix the new foam problems or how it could
affect the future of the space program. Until those solutions are in
hand, the shuttles are not supposed to fly.
Outside experts tried to get NASA's attention in 2003 on advanced
research they thought might help the space agency keep the foam stuck
to the massive external tank. On Thursday, they said they were largely
rebuffed by NASA insiders who said they did not have the resources to
consider new technology.
Steve Nutt, senior associate dean for research at USC and head of the
engineering department's foam research center, submitted a proposal in
2003 to NASA for a fiber-reinforced foam that his team had developed.
Nutt's lab at USC pioneered a system of mixing chopped glass or aramid
fibers into the foam, creating dramatic improvements in strength and
the ability to resist cracking.
"They said the technology had merit, but the interest kind of dried
up," Nutt said. "They said they didn't have the
research-and-development budget to assess this technology."
Nutt said NASA never had the information necessary to decide whether
his technology would work on the shuttle. He added, "I don't want to
bad-mouth NASA. I feel really sorry for those guys. I would still love
to talk to someone at NASA."
A second outside proposal submitted by Oscar Weingart, a materials
science expert who had spent a career in composites, suggested winding
tiny lightweight filaments around the external tank. The concept would
have used 800 pounds of carbon filament to create a strong net around
the foam, at a cost of less than $1 million.
Several academic experts in materials technology said the proposal
looked promising. Weingart, who holds five patents for filament
technology, said he received a brief form letter thanking him.
"It went into a rat hole, as far as I can determine," Weingart said.
Apart from a major redesign, NASA also passed on even modest changes,
including modifying the section that fell off Tuesday. NASA considered
changes to the Protuberance Air Load ramp, or PAL ramp, in December
2004, noting that it had fallen off on two previous launches. It
considered three options to fix the problem, according to NASA
documents. But in the end, the agency decided it was safe to fly
without any changes.
Paul Czysz, a retired professor of aerospace engineering at Washington
University in St. Louis and a former NASA consultant, said in an
interview Wednesday that NASA's inbred and political culture kept it
from solving the foam problem after the Columbia accident. "The
bureaucracy of NASA tends to reinvent what it has already done," Czysz
said.
Foam has bedeviled NASA since the beginning of the shuttle program.
Foam has fallen off the external tank in nearly every shuttle launch.
The hard foam is intended to prevent ice from forming on the outside
skin of the tank, which would represent another debris threat at
launch. It also insulates the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen.
During launch, the foam skin is several hundred degrees on the outside
and several hundred degrees below zero on the inside, while the
aluminum tank is flexing, vibrating and being buffeted by aerodynamic
forces thousands of miles per hour.
James McGuffin-Cawley, professor of material science at Case Western
Reserve University in Cleveland, compared the situation to getting foam
to stick to a soft drink can that deforms easily. "It is amazing to me
that it works," he said.
Indeed, if the accident board had written a tougher recommendation, the
result could have ended the shuttle program.
"The accident board agonized whether to write a tougher recommendation,
knowing it could not be met," said Howard McCurdy, a space expert at
American University. "If they had written that into the report, they
knew the shuttle might not have ever flown again."
But what the agency is left with is a serious crisis.
"The chance of a bad outcome is much greater," McCurdy said. "It is a
very devastating message."
John Pike, executive director of GlobalSecurity.org, a research group
in Alexandria, Va., said that accident investigators and NASA regarded
the shuttle as an old system unworthy of a major investment, and that
the Columbia fixes were much more modest than the fixes after the 1986
Challenger accident, which blew up on launch.
"Most people will not put a lot of money into a car they are planning
to get rid of, and the shuttle is an old car we are getting ready to
get rid of," Pike said. "They basically looked at the fixes and said,
'This is good enough for government work.' "
The shuttle grounding leaves the space program not only with a
technical problem but with an international political mess, said Louis
Freidman, executive director of the Planetary Society.
Europe and Japan have invested billions of dollars into modules for the
space station that only the shuttle can launch. If the project were to
fail, it could undermine U.S. leadership in space programs and raise
doubts that the U.S. could be trusted to deliver, Freidman
acknowledged.
"The very fact that they have grounded the fleet is a very, very big
deal," he said. "NASA should call an emergency meeting of the
International Space Station team members and decide what they can do if
the shuttle is not available."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Times staff writer John Johnson Jr. contributed to this report from
Houston.
.
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