Re: Iran will be 'reported' to UNSC


Count 1 wrote:
> "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuff00@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> news:1138729703.962104.195530@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >
> > Count 1 wrote:
> > > "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuff00@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> > > news:1138725552.534837.178560@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > >
> > > > Count 1 wrote:
> > > > > "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuff00@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> > > > > news:1138722483.804716.232160@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Count 1 wrote:
> > > > > > > "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuff00@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> > > > > > > news:1138718891.962358.317700@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Count 1 wrote:
> > > > > > > > > ....to be followed by a stern wagging of the finger and deep
> > > brow
> > > > > > > furrowing.
> > > > > > > > > If further compliance isn't forth coming the UNSC and the
> IAEA
> > > will
> > > > > fold
> > > > > > > > > their arms and stomp their feet.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I wonder if these firm responses will give anyone comfort
> when
> > > Tel
> > > > > Aviv
> > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > vapourized by a suitcase nuke stamped 'Made in Iran'?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Just a quibble. A suitcase nuke can't vaporize Tel Aviv.
> Maybe
> > > as
> > > > > > > > much as 9 square blocks destroyed - .25 "vaporized".
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Ohhh, I'm sure those Mullah's can crack the problem and figure
> out
> > > how
> > > > > to
> > > > > > > build one that could do the job! They are experts on the Quran,
> > > > > afterall.
> > > > > > > Heck, with those kinds of credentials....
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > http://www.tinyvital.com/Misc/nukes.htm
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Hardly an existential threat.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I was employing hyperbole.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I bet he asks for a raise. :-)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > However if during Iran's next military parade
> > > > > > > there's a column of marching men with big shiny metal suitcases
> > > adorned
> > > > > with
> > > > > > > banners reading "For the destruction of Israel" then we'll
> explore
> > > the
> > > > > topic
> > > > > > > further.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Of course.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Definately an act of war though for
> > > > > > > > which Israel could respond at least a 100 times over.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I'll let them know they have your approval. The rest of us are
> > > trying to
> > > > > > > avert a nuclear detonation.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > By threatening conventional (and possibly nuclear) ones? Seems
> like
> > > > > > unclear thinking.
> > > > >
> > > > > I suspect your incapacity to discern clear thinking is based on your
> > > need to
> > > > > mitigate Iranian responsibility for this growing diplomatic crisis
> and
> > > > > instead focus solely on the international communities response.
> > > > >
> > > > > No one...repeat **no one**- involved in negotiations with Iran is
> > > > > threatening even conventional detonations, much less nuclear ones.
> Those
> > > > > 'threats' simply don't exist.
> > > > >
> > > > > In fact the story I linked to discussed the slow, small step
> diplomacy
> > > that
> > > > > has come to characterize this situation. After all these years they
> > > can't
> > > > > even get a referral, they're limited to making a 'report'.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > In roughly the last 36 hours Iran has granted courtesy access to the
> > > > remaining non-nuclear military site and turned over the uranium
> (bomb?)
> > > > casting papers they received from Pakistan.
> > > >
> > > > So diplomacy does work, eh?
> > > >
> > > > At this rate, by the time the UNSC meets about all they'll have to do
> > > > is drop their trousers and jerk off to fantasies about their own
> > > > nuclear arsenals. Hopefully Aunt Beeb will interrupt them before
> they
> > > > mess up the conference table. :-)
> > >
> > > It is interesting see how much Iran really does fear the UNSC. I have no
> > > idea where that comes from.
> >
> > Sure. Forgot Iraq already?
>
> No. Have you forgotten that the UNSC had nothing to do with invading Iraq?

Right... It was part of the US's process though. And when it didn't
work out the anti-UN propaganda fired up, the US claimed the UNSC
resolution support invading, and it went ahead and attacked anyway.

No, I haven't forgotten the UNSC charade.

>
>
> > > However Iran also continues to deny interviews
> > > to key personnell and Baradei continues to state that after three years
> he
> > > is still not ready to make a judgement on the peaceful nature of their
> > > nuclear program. So it aint' all roses.
> > >
> > > I wonder what the value was of the information they turned over?
> Obviously
> > > not much as it hasn't made a ripple...yet.
> > >
> >
> > On 22 January 2006 the Iranian chief negotiator stated what he thought
> > it was worth.
> >
> > "If you can find anyone in the world who can make a bomb with one and a
> > half pages, we will cover their whole body with gold,"
> >
> >
> http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006/1/23/24A2C433-6E5F-4A49-BA49-7BBEFC8B9078.html
>
> Odd. He made that comment 9 days ago, roughly 216 hours. I wonder what they
> were doing with it for those other 180 hours.
>

Ha, ha, ha!

>
>
> > >
> > > > > > > But ... you know .... whatever.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "Iran does have a 'National Security' you know."
> > > > >
> > > > > And no one - repeat **no one** - is denying them that. They are
> simply
> > > > > trying to make sure Iran is living up to its international
> agreements
> > > > > regarding nuclear weapon research and development. Iran has created
> this
> > > > > situation by not living up to its obligations and continuing to be
> less
> > > than
> > > > > fully cooperative with the IAEA.
> > > >
> > > > Those international agreements which permit them to enrich uranium,
> > > > correct?
> > >
> > > No, not specifically. Article IV is interpreted as giving all parties to
> the
> > > NPT the right to enrich uranium. However no such specifc permission
> exists.
> >
> > Anything "interpreted as" denying it?
> >
> > > Personally I think Article II says Iran - in fact all non-nuclear
> parties -
> > > cannot engage in any dual-use enrichment activity;
> >
> > Then I'd keep IAEA personnel on-site at the enrichment facilities as
> > long as it seemed prudent. Wouldn't want to tempt the Iranians beyond
> > their ability to resist. :-)
> >
> > >
> > > Article II
> > >
> > > Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
> receive
> > > the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
> > > nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive
> > > devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
> > > nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or
> > > receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
> > > nuclear explosive devices.
> > > ***
> > >
> > > One of the reasons Iran raises so much suspicion is their insistence on
> > > using a form of uranium enrichment which can also be used to make bomb
> grade
> > > material.
> >
> > Um, is there a "form of uranium enrichment" which cannot be so used?
>
> Pardon me - I should have said a form of nuclear power dependent on uranium
> enrichment. Candu reactors are powered by uranium dioxide which is derived
> from yellocake in a chemical process. From mining to fuel there is not even
> the potential for bomb grade material to be developed.

I love Candu reactors. Compact package that takes in unenriched
uranium in one end and produces power and plutonium out the other. If
you want the most concealable, simple way of producing bomb grade
fissibles that's the way to go. :-)

>
> > Would Canada and/or the US be willing to donate such facilities in
> > exchange for scrapping the centrifuges?
>
> I suspect Canada would. We've sold Candu reactors to several countries. A
> few years ago a story surfaced about an Iranian official claiming they were
> building a heavy water reactor based on the Candu design, but Canada denied
> we were selling Iran anything.
>

See above re: plutonium as a waster product of Candu reactors. The
IAEA might want to follow up on this one.

>
> > > I think Article II can be interpreted as saying dual-use
> > > technology is a violation. But that's another discussion.
> >
> > No, it's not another discussion in this context. Dual-use talks to
> > the capabilities of the technology not the actual use of the
> > technology, one usage of which may be restricted.
> > Ie, it doesn't prohibit dual-use technology but dual using of
> > technology. If your interpretation is correct.
>
> I admit its a grey area. However given the options available to countries to
> generate nuclear power while not producing material useful in nuclear bombs
> I don't think such an interpretation is a big stretch. Remember, the
> treaties primary purpose is to stop nuclear proliferation. Its not to define
> how countries generate nuclear power.
>

That would be "nuclear *weapons* proliferation".

>
> > > Additionally, Iran doesn't have the uranium reserves to sustain a long
> term
> > > civilian nuclear power project. They'll have to rely on imports.
> >
> > Niger's in the market I understand. :-)
>
> As is Canada and Australia, not to mention Russia. But the point remains,
> Iran's argument that it needs to own and manage its own domestic uranium
> enrichment capacity so as to not be 'dependent' on other nations is
> bull***.

I'm not sure. Most uranium production figures are just that - uranium
production figures. I don't know how much uranium Iran could produce
on it's own. It's not yet time for it to try after all.

This seems to summarize, roughly, what is known about Iranian
production capabilities in 1999:

Exploratory work has been undertaken for more than twenty years and a
number of small prospects have been defined. In recent years the
Exploration Division of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran has been
active at several locations in the centre and north-west of the
country.

Reasonably assured resources (in-situ) amount to 491 tonnes, with a
further 876 tonnes of additional resources (EAR-I), both recoverable at
US$ 80-130/kgU. Undiscovered conventional resources consist of 4 500
tonnes in category EAR-II, plus 5 000 tonnes of speculative resources,
both recoverable at less than US$ 130/kgU.

http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/publications/reports/ser/uranium/uranium.asp

These 10,900 tons are about 15-20% of total worldwide yearly demand
forecast for 2015.

Also on the above site is a chart showing substantial reserves in Asia.
Perhaps the Iranian strategic planning anticipates bartering oil for
uranium with the Chinese.

> They will have to be dependent on other nations, and they know it.
> All we're saying is, instead of importing the ore, dismantle the expensive
> and controversial centrifuges and import the fuel instead.
>
> What's the big deal?

Pride maybe.

.

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